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Abstract
In this article we discuss the problem of finding an interpretation of quantum mechanics which
provides an objective account of physical reality. In the first place we discuss the problem of inter-
pretation and analyze the importance of such an objective account in physics. In this context we
present the problems which arise when interpreting the quantum wave function within the orthodox
formulation of quantum mechanics. In connection to this critic, we expose the concept of ‘entity’ as
an epistemological obstruction.
In the second part of this paper we discuss the relation between actuality and potentiality in
classical and quantum physics, and continue to present the concept of ontological potentiality which
is distinguished from the generic Aristotelian notion of potentiality in terms of ‘becoming actual’. In
this paper our main aim is to provide an objective interpretation of quantum mechanics which allows
us to discuss the meaning of physical reality according to the theory. For this specific propose we
present the concept of faculty in place of the concept of ‘entity’. Within our theory of faculties, we
continue to discuss and interpret two paradigmatic experiments of quantum mechanics such as the
double-slit and Schrodinger’s cat.
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Perhaps in the future one shall have to rethink what it
really means to get at the end of an experiment a number,
that one has to compare with the number predicted by the theory.
Diederik Aerts.
Introduction
This article deals with the problem of interpretation in quantum mechanics. This problem has haunted
physics since the very beginning of the last century when Max Plank made a small change in the equation
which governed the emission of radiation of a black body. The shift from a continuous conception of
energy to a discrete one cleared a path which classicality had overlooked. Still today we are trying to
understand the meaning of the theory of quanta, its possibilities and impossibilities. Its possibilities
regard not only technical developments but also philosophical viewpoints, the impossibilities expose the
limits of our classical conception of the world. In this paper we intend to propose an interpretation of
quantum mechanics which can provide an objective account of physical reality. The price we are willing to
pay is the re-consideration of what is to be considered ‘physically real’ according to quantum mechanics.
2
1 The Problem of Interpretation
In the year 1900 Max Planck expressed the idea that energy is not continuous, but rather, comes in
discrete packages called quanta. At this very moment the departure from our classical conception of
the world begun. The conception which had been worked out since Plato and Aristotle till Newton and
Kant, was now for the first time, seriously threatened. The critics came from different scopes: philosophy,
music, poetry and even physics tackled the metaphysical conception of the world at the end of the 19th
century. The nature of the problems raised by the new quantum theory revealed a critical confrontation
with the classical worldview. When Schro¨dinger wrote his famous ‘cat article’ in 1935 it was already clear
that the return to the departed land was not possible anymore.
“[...] if I wish to ascribe to the model at each moment a definite (merely not exactly known to
me) state, or (which is the same) to all determining parts definite (merely not exactly known to me)
numerical values, then there is no supposition as to these numerical values to be imagined that would
not conflict with some portion of quantum theoretical assertions.” E. Schro¨dinger ([59], p.156)
As physicists we are interested in giving a picture of the world, a story that puts together all which we
have experienced through creation and discovery. Although we have learned a lot since this critical period
the ‘classical conception of the world’ has remained our single view, that through which we understand
and describe our existence.1 This view has certain presuppositions which confront the basic structure of
the quantum formalism, making it very difficult —maybe even impossible— to paste it altogether with
our previous classical ideas. However, after endless discussions regarding the meaning of the quantum, in
the year 2000, exactly one century after the beginning of the voyage, Christopher Fuchs and Asher Peres
finally settled the question: Quantum Theory Needs no ‘Interpretation’.
“[...] quantum theory does not describe physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm
for computing probabilities for the macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences
of experimental interventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only
interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or theorists.” C. Fuchs and A. Peres ([29], p.1)
Of course this emphasis in prediction in detriment to description can be severely questioned. The main
objection against this instrumentalistic point of view is that the success of a theory can not be explained,
that is to say, we do not know how and why quantum physics is in general able to carry out predictions
(and in particular with such a fantastic accuracy). Undoubtedly a “hard” instrumentalist may simply
refuse to look for such an explanation, since it is in fact the mere effectiveness of a theory that which
justifies it, so that he may not be interested in advancing towards a justification of that effectiveness. If
one takes such a position there is nothing left to say. Just like the Oracle of Delphos provided always
the right answer to the ancient Greeks, quantum mechanics provides us with the correct probability
distribution for every experiment we can think of. So there is nothing else we need; that is all we can
ask from a physical theory and there is no need to supplement it with an interpretation. This end to the
discussion was something which Werner Heisenberg and Wolfgang Pauli could have not foreseen, even
though they had called the attention over such an elusive answer on the question of interpretation many
years before:
“Wolfgang Pauli hizo esta observacio´n: “El silencio no se debio´ a que tu explicacin fuese mala.
Pertenece, en efecto a la profesio´n de fe del positivismo el que deben aceptarse los hechos reales sin
reparo alguno. Si mal no recuerdo, Wittgenstein afirma aproximadamente lo siguiente: ‘el mundo es
todo aquello que sucede’, ‘el mundo es el conjunto de los hechos, no de las cosas.’ Cuando se admite
este postulado como punto de partida, es forzoso admitir sin vacilacio´n una teor´ıa que representa
tales hechos. Los positivistas saben que la meca´nica cua´ntica describe con exactitud los feno´menos
ato´micos; por consiguiente, no tienen motivo alguno para oponerse a ella. Todo lo que los f´ısicos
an˜adimos despue´s, como, por ejemplo, complementariedad, interferencia de probabilidades, relaciones
de indeterminacio´n, diferencia entre sujeto y objeto, etc., todo esto les parece a los positivistas un
lirismo carente de claridad, un retorno al pensamiento precient´ıfico, pura charlataner´ıa. De todos
modos, no hay que tomarlo en serio y, en el mejor de los casos, resulta inofensivo. Quiza´ tal concepcio´n
constituya en s´ı misma un sistema lo´gico cerrado. Pero yo no entiendo entonces que´ queremos decir
cuando decimos ‘comprender la naturaleza’.” W. Heisenberg ([33], p.255)
1As Constantin Piron has pointed out the revolutions of relativity and quantum have not yet taken place [47].
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I believe that physics is not merely about algorithms, it is not only a predictive machinery, its
importance cannot be reduced to that of being ‘a source of technical developments’. Physics is the gentle
communion between mathematical expressions, description and experience. Its basic presupposition is
that Nature exists, and we, as physicists, want to discuss what Nature is. Physics is a particular way
of studying the Being, this is why it involves epsitemology on the one side, and ontology on the other.2
Ontology is for us a picture, an abstract conceptualization, a story of a world which we seek to understand.
As we have discussed in detail in [52, 54], in quantum mechanics, it is the development of the ontology
which remains a central issue:
“When the layman says “reality” he usually thinks that he is speaking about something which
is self-evidently known; while to me it appears to be specifically the most important and extremely
difficult task of our time to work on the elaboration of a new idea of reality.” W. Pauli ([42], p.193)
This is the problem of providing meaning to our theories, the problem of understanding, which is at
the same time the problem of interpretation.
1.1 An Objective Account of Physical Reality
Objectivity is one of the fundamental cornerstones of science. This is the very democratic principle which
governs it: everybody can check by himself, with the proper means, a certain aspect of a theory. This
attitude draws the most important distinction with other approaches towards the problem of reality. In
particular, religious or mystic views of reality depart from this democratic conception; for example, it is
not necessarily true that everybody can be enlightened or see a miracle. To have a vision is a personal
experience, maybe not even communicable to someone else. Contrary to science, religious and mystic
approaches to the world in which we live are based on personal experience.
We believe that science is committed to objectivity. By this we mean that, firstly, their propositions
must be robust under intersubjective agreement.3 Everyone should be able to check a certain character
of a theory, the empirical elements of a certain theory should not be viewed only by a ‘chosen one’. For
example, the phenomena discussed in the theory of gravitation, by which a body is attracted to the
earth, should be (in principle) robust under the checking of anyone who wishes to perform an experiment
which tests the theory. Most of miracle-type experiences do not follow this presumption, for example
the existence of ghosts is not an inter-subjective experience, generally speaking there are only gifted
people or mediums which get in contact with ghosts; i.e. it is not necessary true that everyone can see a
ghost. In second place, in order for a theory to be objective, we need a set of elements, represented in
the mathematical formulation of the theory, which provide access to empirical recognition and are robust
under certain consistency constrains provided by the ontology to which the theory is committed. The
consistency constrains deal with the mode of existence of the elements under investigation. Together,
all this structure provides meaning to physical reality and tells us what the theory is about, this is over
which we must agree and disagree as physicists.
However, it is important to remark that intersubjective agreement is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to define physical objectivity. Physics is not just a consistent discourse about phenomena,
physics does not only talk about directly observable phenomena, and this is why, it has been directly
engaged with the history of metaphysics. We tend to accord with Einstein who expressed very clearly
the guiding line of physics:
“[...] it is the purpose of theoretical physics to achieve understanding of physical reality which
exists independently of the observer, and for which the distinction between ‘direct observable’ and
‘not directly observable’ has no ontological significance; this aim furnishes the physicist at least part
of the motivation for his work; but the only decisive factor for the question whether or not to accept
a particular physical theory is its empirical success.” A. Einstein (Quoted from [14], p.175)
It seems quite common nowadays to state a kind of reluctant view on the relation between physical
reality and the world. There are many positions which seem to propose a new trend of physics which
does not have anything to do with “physical reality”. The importance of technical developments is closely
related to this new conception which seems to forget the problems and presuppositions of doing physics.
2For a more detailed discussion in relation to this position see [50, 51].
3D’Espagnat has called this mode of reference: weakly objective statements. See for example [17] p. 98.
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The question raises: if we are not talking about “the world”, about “physical reality”, then what is
physics about?
Niels Bohr’s ideas have played a central role in the development of physics in the 20th century, placing
the discipline within the main philosophical line of discussion of the period, i.e., the problem of language
and its relation to ontology and epistemology.4 Maybe the most clear statement about this point is the
famous quotation by Aage Petersen. According to his long time assistant Bohr once declared when asked
whether the quantum world could be considered as somehow mirroring an underlying quantum reality:
“There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong
to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about
Nature” N. Bohr quoted by A. Petersen ([46], p.8)
Language appears here not only as the regulative notion of access, but as the limit and final goal of
physics itself. Or as Bohr used to say: “We are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say
what is up and what is down. The word ‘reality’ is also a word, a word which we must learn to use cor-
rectly.”5 In Bohr’s writings there is no reference to ontology, nor to physical reality. His analysis remains
in this point extremely superficial turning quantum mechanics into a theory of knowledge about classical
phenomena. Objectivity is viewed by Bohr as intersubjective agreement, only in terms of a linguistic
discourse: “The description of atomic phenomena has in these respects a perfectly objective character,
in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer and that therefore... no am-
biguity is involved in the communication of observation.”6 We will return to this point later in section 6.1.
In early Greek thought the study of Nature was approached through contemplation, one could gain
true knowledge of a Cosmos which was meant to exist. Physics was born from this idea, which was later
engaged with more specific conceptions. Maybe the most important presupposition in physical thought,
which can be traced to the reading of Parmenides by Plato and Aristotle, is that the Cosmos is constituted
by entities. This idea was formally expressed by Aristotle in his logic, which was nothing but the building
blocks of our classical conception of Nature.7 Much later, it was Isaac Newton himself who was able to
translate into a closed mathematical formalism the ontological presuppositions present in Aristotelian
logic. Classical physics is thus, nothing but the study of preexistent entities, of things which exist. This
is the ideal of classical thought which we must clearly recognize in order to understand not only its power
but also its limitations.
It is through the conception of the Being, as an entity, that science has approached the world since
Plato and Aristotle. Let it be a particle, a wave or a field, an entity is a primitive concept of the theory
which preexists to our analysis of its existence. In the case of quantum mechanics the problem is raised
because of its apparent subjective character with respect to the entities under study; i.e. the mode of
Being of elementary particles. In quantum theory the epistemic foundation based in the ideas of classical
physics appears to be at stake, this becomes clear from Heisenberg’s 1927 paper ([31], p.187) in which
he writes: “I believe that one can formulate the emergence of the classical ‘path’ of a particle pregnantly
as follows: the ‘path’ comes into being only because we observe it.” In quantum mechanics there is an
incompatible structure which precludes the possibility of thinking of the preexistence of properties, if one
is willing, at the same time, to keep the categorical structure of entities.8
In quantum mechanics, in order to define the entity under study, we need to choose a cut and
objectivity is regained only once the measuring apparatus is chosen. As expressed by Pauli: “[...] there
remains still in the new kind of theory an objective reality, insamuch as these theories deny any possibility
for the observer to influence the results of a measurement, once the experimental arrangement is chosen.”9
Even though, reproducibility of the result is then obtained in the form of objective probability laws for
series of repeated measurements, the problem remains untouched. The problem deals explicitly with the
dependence of the choice of the context in relation to the determination of its existence. Einstein was
4The linguistic turn refers to a major development in Western philosophy during the 20th century, the most important
characteristic of which is the focusing of philosophy on language as constructing reality [58]. The relation between the
linguistic turn and Bohr’s development is discussed in [56].
5Quoted from: Philosophy of Science, 37, 1934, p. 157.
6N. Bohr quoted from [17] p. 98.
7See for discussion [63].
8I have discussed this point in more detail in [51] and in [54].
9Quoted from [43], p.33, emphasis added.
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worried exactly about this point, about the impossibility of quantum mechanics to refer to an objective
account of physical reality. As Wolfgang Pauli recalled in a letter to Bohr dated February 15, 1955:
“[...] ‘Like the moon has a definite position’ Einstein said to me last winter, ‘whether or not we
look at the moon, the same must also hold for the atomic objects, as there is no sharp distinction
possible between these and macroscopic objects. Observation cannot create an element of reality
like position, there must be something contained in the complete description of physical reality which
corresponds to the possibility of observing a position, already before the observation has been actually
made.’ [...]” W. Pauli ([41], p.60)
Niels Bohr followed a different path, he wanted to regain objectivity by watching quantum theory from
a distance, standing on the well known heights of the classical scheme. But, if the objective character of
quantum theory ought to be secured by the use of the classical language, we certainly get into a vicious
circle. We take it that the objective character of a theory should be secured by the theory itself, or, in
case it is an appendix of a different theory, one should clearly understand their relationship. As it stands,
the position of Bohr forces us into a very unclear relation between the classical world and the quantum
formalism, which does not seem to have a place in the classical conception of the world, but nevertheless,
talks about it.
This is the problem which is raised in quantum theory: we have the need to give some picture of
what is going on, and explain at the same time, why is it that we can predict with such an accuracy so
many phenomena. The natural attitude towards the problem, specially after the second half of the 20th
century, has been to force the interpretation into our known classical scheme. Such proposals, like for
example Bohmian mechanics, Many Worlds and GRW, presuppose the classical conception of the world
(or a similar variant of it), and then try to fit the formalism of the theory into this pre-conceived idea
of reality. On the contrary, we consider that the term ‘reality’ should not be taken as a primitive in the
task of science, rather, it should be conceived as a goal conceptualization. Physical reality should not
be a pre-established concept nor a prejudice in observing and relating empirical data, but rather a goal
concept which should be transformed and developed. We should not expect reality to be... as we would
like it to be; but we must constantly revise the conceptual framework with which such a description is
expressed. Trying to understand reality (in physical terms) presupposes that we do not know much about
it. It is this very humble attitude which must guide science. Our strategy will be to seek for the objective
part of the structure in the quantum formalism; forgetting for a moment the ontological commitments.
We have to remind ourselves we are only scientists wondering about the world, a very mysterious world
indeed.
1.2 Interpreting Quantum Mechanics
Quantum mechanics was developed in the first three decades of the 20th century by, mainly, the German
speaking community of physicists. The discussions did not stop between them, not even between those
who seemed to share a common view —as for example between Niels Bohr, Wolfgang Pauli and Werner
Heisenberg— until the late ’50. These discussions were certainly of most importance for the development
of the theory. The unfortunate term “Copenhagen interpretation” invented by Heisenberg in 1958 and
used today by the average physicist as a set of weird rules of which one should not ask too much, has
helped to silence these discussions [36]. A close reading of these authors is enough to discover there is
no single interpretation; their ideas and philosophical grounds remain different and even incompatible in
substantial points. Instead of a “Copenhagen interpretation” I believe it would be more appropriate to
refer to the “Copenhagen discussions”. These discussions were concentrated, firstly, in the problem of
how to make sense of the formalism in relation to language, through neo-Kantian philosophy in the case
of Bohr, and secondly, to the problem of reality, through Plato’s philosophy in the case of Heisenberg
[65], and liked to the philosophy of Schopenahuer, in the case of Pauli [41].
Because we understand quantum mechanics as providing a radical departure of our classical conception
of the world, our attitude regarding its interpretation will remain radical as well. We take quantum
mechanics very seriously, we believe that its formalism must be understood in terms of a language
capable of expressing what this theory has to tell us about reality. Paul Dirac ([15], p.10) stated that:
“[...] the main object of physical science is not the provision of physical pictures, but is the formulation
of laws governing phenomena and the application of these laws to the discovery of new phenomena. If
a picture exists, so much the better; but whether a picture exists or not is a matter of only secondary
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importance.” On the contrary, we think that the importance of pictures does not have a secondary place
in physical theories. It is through such pictures that physicists are able to provide new ideas and to
create new experiences. These pictures are for the physicists guiding lines without which we would sink,
no hope or possibility to approach a new land would remain without these lighthouses. Exactly this kind
of guide is lacking in quantum mechanics. There is a state of affairs in physics which might be regarded
as analogous to the situation of special relativity at the end of the 19th century. The formalism of the
theory is finished, the experiments which confirm it have been done, but still, our unwillingness to give
up our classical classical conception of the world has lead us into all sort of ‘ether-type solutions’ such
as: ether-fields, ether-worlds, ether-jumps, etc.
In order to provide a suitable framework for a proper analysis and development of the interpretation
of quantum mechanics we have presented the complementary descriptions approach [50, 51, 52]. A first
point of departure of this framework is a development of the idea of complementarity, which must refer
not only to complementarity between mutually incompatible phenomena, but also to complementarity
between incommensurable descriptions. A description is a general framework in which concepts relate,
concepts and relations which determine the precondition to access a certain expression of reality. A de-
scription involves creation, it is a condition of possibility for experiencing and understanding, it expresses
a limit under which it is possible to provide meaning. But a limit is at the same time an expression
of something which lies outside, an externity which is not recognized, which must be forgotten. This
is why our development deals specifically with an exposition of the limitations of a definite description.
The complementarity of descriptions is an expression regarding the impossibility of reduction and the
acceptance of the limitations implied by the frameworks themselves. In this line of investigation we have
presented the thesis that classical physics and quantum physics are complementary descriptions which
involve mutually incompatible concepts and pictures.
Let us be clear about this point, a physical theory is a whole which discusses, through a mathematical
formulation and a conceptual scheme, a certain expression of the Being. The Being is expressed by the
theory in terms of its conceptual structure and its mathematical formulation. Against naive realism,
physics is not about strongly objective statements —which refer directly to some attributes of the things
under study— as D’Espagant calls them [17]. Physics regards the particular region just in between math-
ematical expressions, conceptual description and experience.10
The core of the problem regarding the interpretational issues of quantum theory are an explicit
expression of a more fundamental one, the problem of existence. What does it mean that something
exists? Classical thought had forgotten this question which must be reviewed in quantum physics. We
are ready now to make a detour and continue beyond the limits imposed by our classical conception of
the world.
2 Interpreting the Quantum Wave Function
The most basic problem in quantum mechanics remains to interpret the quantum wave function. What is
Ψ? What does it represent? We understand this question as independent of another one, which is taken
as equivalent by many: What does a superposition mean? In earlier works we have called the attention
over a clear distinction which must be taken into account for a proper discussion of these subjects. This
distinction is between what we have called earlier ‘perspective’ and ‘context’ [48].
In the orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics the wave function is expressed by an abstract
mathematical form. Its representation can be expressed through the choice of a determined basis B.
The non-represented wave function is a perspective which expresses pure potentia, the potentiality of an
action which makes possible the choice of a definite context. A perspective expresses the power for a
definite representation to take place, it deals with the choice between mutually incompatible contexts.
The perspective cannot be written, it shows itself through the different representations, each of which is a
part but not the whole. The importance of defining this notion is related to the structure of the quantum
formalism which, contrary to classical mechanics, is essentially holistic and thus, intrinsically contextual;
i.e., it does not allow for the simultaneous existence of mutually incompatible contexts. The context is a
definite representation of the perspective, it depends and configures in relation to the concepts which are
10The ontology that we’d like to put forward is closely related to Spinoza, through which the one is expressed in different
modes, by the many representations. It should be stressed here that in the Spinozist ontology there is no pluralism involved,
avoiding the main problem of relativism into which Putnam’s internalism is dragged into by the linguistic turn [55].
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used in the description. The different possible contexts can not be thought as encompassing a whole of
which they are but a part (see [51], section 1.2).
It is only at the level of the context that one can speak of properties. Different set of properties
arise in each representation, which relate and are configured by the logical principles which govern the
description. In the case of classical mechanics properties relate via the principles of classical (Aristotelian)
logic; i.e. the principle of existence, the principle of identity and the principle of non-contradiction (see
section 4). The reductionistic character of the structure arises from the choice of these ontological
principles, which at the same time, allows us to speak of “something” which exists. It is only because
one presupposes this structural configuration that one is allowed to speak about entities. In quantum
mechanics the properties arising in each context do not follow classical relationships but are determined
by a different logic. Heisenberg’s principle of indetermination, Bohr’s principle of complementarity and
the superposition principle provide a structural relationship between quantum-properties which cannot
be subsumed into classical thought.11 When speaking of properties, one must recognize the discourse in
which they are embedded. In many discussions regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics one
talks about quantum and classical properties just like “properties” without a proper mention to its mode
of being, this lack of clarification produces lots of pseudo-problems and misunderstandings which have
been discussed earlier (see [51], section 2).
The perspective has not been acknowledged in quantum mechanics due to the metaphysical presup-
positions which involve the characterization of a quantum state as a vector in Hilbert space. In orthodox
quantum mechanics it is assumed that the vector “exists”, independently of the basis in which it is
‘placed’. That which we need to discuss is the relation between a mathematical expression and physi-
cal existence. For the mathematician the definition of a vector has a clear expression and presents no
problem whatsoever. However, when discussing the physical interpretation of the vector as representing
a “state of a system” things get more foggy. In the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics the
basis plays an active role, it constitutes the existence of the set of properties which, at a later stage,
determines that which will be studied. “That which will be studied”, and can be best characterized by a
superposition, can not be subsumed into the classical categories of an ‘entity’. Physically, it is assumed
that the Ψ contains all the different representations as existents, this means that all the representations
can be captured together in terms of an identity, a unity. The Ψ is something which thus, should be
able to give an account of the totality of the different representations as showing parts of a sameness
[30]. But as we know, specially through the Kochen Specker (KS) theorem [38], the “same” vector cannot
support the existence of its different representations simultaneously, precluding in this way the possibility
of thinking of Ψ in terms of something which refers to an entity. As we will show in this paper, it is
exactly this idea which cannot be maintained in quantum mechanics.
The distinction between perspective and context was introduced in [48] in order to distinguish between
the different modes of existence of the properties in the modal interpretation. Following van Fraassen’s
distinction between dynamical state and value state, we have distinguished between holistic context and
reductionistic context. This distinction regards the path from a superposition to an ensemble, from an
improper mixture to a proper mixture. Notice that one might talk in a reductionistic context as if one
would have an entity, provided that we forget the procedure of successive cuts by which we arrived from
the holistic context with improper mixtures. In such case we might talk as if these mixtures were proper,
and thus recover the logical principles which allow us to talk about entities. This interpretational jump
has no justification whatsoever, but remains necessary for the later interpretation in terms of probability.
(see [51], section 1.4)
A brief outline of what we tried to explain until now can be provided in the following scheme:
PERSPECTIVE HOLISTIC REDUCTIONISTIC MEASUREMENT
CONTEXT CONTEXT RESULT
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION Ψ |ψB〉 |ψB〉 αk, |αk〉
CONCEPTUAL EXPRESSION – superposition ensemble single term
PROPERTY – holisic/non-Boolean reductionistic/Boolean actual
11For a detailed analysis and discussion of the principles of indetermination, complementarity and superposition as those
which determine the fundamental logical structure of quantum theory see [40].
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2.1 The Idea of ‘Entity’ as a First Approximation
Since Aristotle presented his logic, the idea of entity became the guiding line of physical thought. The
idea of entity is based in the ontological principles of logic presented by Aristotle as a solution to the
problem of movement. It is through these principles that an entity is capable of unifying, of totalizing in
terms of “sameness”. It is the idea of entity which generated the development of physics since Aristotle,
this is why we might say today that the history of classical physics is the history of physical entities.
As noted by Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨scker [64], Martin Heidegger discussed in Sein und Zeit the
problem of confronting the classical conception of the world, a world which Plato and Aristotle had
created for us. It is since Plato that occidental thought has confused the ‘Being’ with the ‘entity’. The
confusion resides in asking about ‘entities’ instead of asking about the ‘Being itself’, entitazing the Being.
In other words, in asking always about the Being in terms of an entity, not allowing for the Being to exist
in a different form than that provided by the idea of entity. This mistake was repeated once and again
not only in philosophy but also in physics; in this sense Alfred North Whitehead was correct to point out
that the history of western philosophy has remained nothing but footnotes to Plato.
That which plays the roˆle of an entity in a physical theory must have a counterpart in the mathematical
formulation. In the case of quantum mechanics we have a very good mathematical formulation but no
consistent interpretation. So we can ask ourselves, as a first beat, if the quantum wave function Ψ can
be considered as referring to an entity. If Ψ is the one to play our staring roˆle in the theory, there are
certain conditions which it must fulfill. First of all, it must be robust under different transformations,
these transformations should allow us to state consistently that that which we transform remains the
‘same’. The most obvious examples are given by the Galilean transformations in classical mechanics,
and the Lorentz transformations in special relativity. In quantum mechanics this might seem to work at
first sight, because Ψ is considered to be nothing but a vector in Hilbert space, and thus, by definition,
an invariant (something which does not change under rotations). But, as we shall see, things get very
tricky...
In special relativity theory a context is given by a definite inertial frame of reference. However, there is
no need of defining the perspective because the invariance principle, given by the Lorentz transformations,
allows us to think all these different contexts as existing in actuality, as frameworks for events which
pertain to physical reality. There is a way by which one can relate all the events which actually exist
in the same picture (even though their relation is different of course form that of classical mechanics).
In quantum mechanics, on the other hand, a context is given by a definite experimental set up which is
mathematically represented by a complete set of commuting observables (C.S.C.O.), equivalently defined
by a quantum wave function in a definite representation/basis. But because of Bohr’s principle of
complementarity there is an intrinsic, ontological incompatibility between different representations. The
KS theorem, to which we will return later, does not allow to think a property, which is seen from different
contexts, as existing in actuality. Thus, the different contexts can not be thought in terms of possible
views of one and the same “something”, namely, the Ψ. In classical mechanics and special relativity
theory, this problem does not arise because one can relate contexts through the Galilean and Lorentz
transformations. One may say that in these theories one can reduce all the different views to a single
context,12 and this is why the idea of perspective becomes superfluous. The formal structure of classical
mechanics and relativity theory is reductionistic, and thus, part and whole can be univocally related.
We have provided the distinction between the perspective, in which we have the non represented
mathematical form Ψ, and the context, in which a particular representation is expressed through the
choice of a basis B and we can write the wave function as |ψB〉. We believe that this distinction is very
important in order to clarify the problem we are discussing. The ‘weird structure’ of quantum mechanics
avoids that we can talk of the different representations |ψB〉, |ψB′〉, |ψB′′〉, ... as views of “the same” Ψ.
This is due to the fact, that the choice of the basis plays an active role in the definition of that which exists
in actuality. The wave function Ψ is an abstract mathematical form which can be expressed in different
representations, each of which is given in the formalism by different basis {B,B′, B′′, ...}; each basis
can be interpreted as providing the set of properties which are determined. For each representation we
obtain respectively {|ψB〉, |ψB′〉, |ψB′′〉, ...}.13 We have to choose in which basis we are going to write the
wave function (context) just like in classical mechanics we choose a certain reference frame to write our
equations of motion. But in quantum mechanics, contrary to classical mechanics or special relativity, each
12Even if we do not know the context we can think in terms of possible contexts, in terms of ignorance.
13More generally one can think in terms of density operators: firstly a ρ without a definite basis, and secondly,
{ρB , ρB′ , ρB′′ , ...} given by the density operator in each basis {B,B′, B′′, ...}.
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representation/basis expresses a context which can be, in principle, incompatible to a different context.
This is where all the trouble starts: compatibility.14
Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker proved that in a Hilbert space d ≥ 3, it is impossible to associate
numerical values, 1 or 0, with every projection operator Pm, in such a way that, if a set of it commuting Pm
satisfies
∑
Pm = q, the corresponding values of the projection operators, v(Pm), namely v(Pm) = 0 or
1, also satisfy
∑
v(Pm) = 1. This means that if we have three operators A, B and C, where [A,B] = 0,
[A,C] = 0 but [B,C] 6= 0 it is not the same to measure A alone, or A together with B, or together
with C. The principles of quantum mechanics produce an holistic structure which is responsible for the
impossibility of assigning a compatible family of truth valuations to the projection operators of different
contexts. If we take L to be an orthomodular lattice and the global valuation as providing the values of
all magnitudes at the same time maintaining a compatibility condition, (in the sense that whenever two
magnitudes shear one or more projectors the values assigned to those projectors are the same from every
context) one can state in algebraic terms the KS theorem as follows [18]:
Theorem 2.1 If H is a Hilbert space such that dim(H) > 2, then a global valuation, i.e. a family of
compatible valuations of the contexts, over L(H) is not possible.
This has a direct consequence in the entity-interpretation of the quantum wave function Ψ, because if we
take an entity to be a set of definite properties which exist in actuality regardless of measuring or not,
subjectivity appears as a major obstacle. In quantum theory the KS theorem shows that the concept of
choice is entangled with that of existence: the entity exists only because we choose. As we have discussed
before, this ‘subjective’ or ‘contextual entity’ is completely unacceptable in physics, a discipline which
presupposes an objective account of that which is considered to be physically real. In classical mechanics,
on the contrary, due to its compatible15 (reductionistic) structure, one can neglect this level —which
we have called earlier ‘perspective’. Reductionistic theories do not suffer from this “problem” because
their structure always allows for a Boolean valuation. Coloring every atom in the universe (every point
in phase space) would not arise a problem because the universe is nothing but the sum of these atoms.
Classically, the choice of the context discovers —rather than creates— the elements of physical reality,
which were of course already there... just like the moon is outside there regardless of our choice to look
at her or not.
The perspective can be represented in infinitely many ways, each of which determines a definite
relation between the properties of a system. A ‘new’ context appears each time we choose to change
the representation. The perspective cannot be a priori decomposed into elementary blocks, these holistic
contexts, and the whole from which they ‘become’, should be regarded as expressing the essential character
of quantum mechanics, that of precluding the possibility of thinking about the quantum wave function in
terms of the classical principles of identity, unity and totality. There is a tension between the notion of
entity and the quantum formalism which has not been yet resolved. This tension is most clearly expressed
through the loss of an objective account of physical reality in terms of entities (such as elementary
particles).
“Einstein’s opposition to [quantum mechanics] is again reflected in his papers which he published,
at first in collaborations with Rosen and Podolsky , and later alone, as a critique on the concept of
reality in quantum mechanics. We often discussed these questions together, and I invariably profited
very greatly even when I could not agree with Einstein’s view. “Physics is after all the description
of reality” he said to me, continuing, with a sarcastic glance in my direction “or should I perhaps
say physics is the description of what one merely imagines?” This question clearly shows Einstein’s
concern that the objective character of physics might be lost through a theory of the type of quantum
mechanics, in that as a consequence of a wider conception of the objectivity of an explanation of nature
the difference between physical reality and dream or hallucination might become blurred.” W. Pauli
([43], p.122)
14For an analysis of the concept of compatibility see [1] and also the very interesting passage of the book of Asher Peres
[45], chapter 7.
15Even though one might have incompatible experimental setups (contexts) in classical mechanics, such as those proposed
by Diederik Aerts: A piece of wood which has the property of ‘being burnable’ and of ‘floating’ [1]. One can always think
of these contexts in terms of ignorance, there is no proper/ontological incompatibility, as it is always possible in principle
to valuate every property without inconsistencies. It is possible to think that the piece would definitely has the mentioned
properties.
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As a second beat we could think that, at least |ψB〉, the wave function in a given basis, might allow
an interpretation in terms of an entity. If we do not take a preferred basis we normally express |ψB〉 as a
linear combination of elements, this is called a superposition. The principle of superposition was regarded
by Paul Dirac as one of the most important features of quantum mechanics:
“The nature of the relationships which the superposition principle requires to exist between the
states of any system is of a kind that cannot be explained in terms of familiar physical concepts.
One cannot in the classical sense picture a system being partly in each of two states and see the
equivalence of this to the system being completely in some other state. There is an entirely new idea
involved, to which one must get accustomed and in terms of which one must proceed to build up an
exact mathematical theory, without having any detailed classical picture.” P. Dirac ([15], p.12)
Unfortunately the idea or regarding a superposition as representing an entity does not work either.
Given a superposition: |ψB〉 = α|a〉+ β|b〉; if we take the elements of |ψB〉, |a〉 or |b〉 as existing both in
actuality, it might happen that |a〉 and |b〉 represent a property and its opposite! So at one and the same
time we have ‘up’ and ‘down’, ‘dead’ and ‘alive’, ‘black’ and ‘white’, of that of which we are predicating.
But according to the principle of non-contradiction, the most certain of all principles, everything is or is
not the case. If we are to retain classical logic this leads to contradictions, and thus to inconsistencies.
One could try then, in principle, to interpret |ψB〉 as being actually one of the two elements of the
superposition, which of them? we do not know until we perform the experiment, which always gives
one of the two possibilities. Off course we know this idea is simply wrong, it is incompatible with the
formalism of quantum mechanics which does not allow to provide an ignorance interpretation of the
elements of a superposition. So we got to a dead end, the elements of the superposition do not exist in
the mode of being of actuality, the only mode of being which we are accustomed to call ‘real’. But if one
firmly believes that such thing as a superposition exists, and this is what quantum mechanics tells us if
taken seriously, it seems we might be in the need of creating a new way of dealing with these elements of
the quantum structure, a way, which should not depend on the idea of entity. We will come back to this
discussion later in section 5.2.
2.2 The Classical Statistical Conception: Probability and Possibility
If one learns quantum mechanics for the first time, it might seem that the theory is essentially statistical
and thus refers only to probabilistic statements. One is then allowed to continue the reasoning and
infer that quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory which only talks about ensembles of systems and
does not provide any direct answer refereing to an individual system. If such would be the case, there
would be no interpretational problems whatsoever, |ψB〉 = α|a〉 + β|b〉 would represent, not a single
system, but an ensemble of them; |α|2 and |β|2 being the (classical) probabilities to obtain respectively
|a〉 or |b〉. It would be then possible to interpret quantum mechanics as referring to some unknown but
actually existent state of affairs. This is of course the idea which the concept of probability presupposes,
i.e. that there is an actual state of affairs regardless of weather we know it or not.16 But quantum
mechanics uses a non-Kolmogorovian type of probability which does not allow to interpret probability
in terms of ignorance or uncertainty about an actual state of affairs. Mathematically this encounters
no inconvenience whatsoever, but from a physical point of view it is a catastrophe, simply because we
loose the meaning of ‘probability’ in the quantum domain. At the time this was not easy to understand
and even today, this confusion continues to burden quantum theory. This can be witnessed from many
approaches which neglect the conceptual reach of the ideas which must be reformulated due to quantum
mechanics. For example, according to Feynman and Hibbs, the concept of probability does not change
in quantum mechanics:
“The concept of probability is not altered in quantum mechanics. When we say the probability of
a certain outcome of an experiment is p, we mean the conventional thing, i.e.; that if the experiment
is repeated many times, one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome in question is
roughly p. We shall not be at all concerned with analyzing or defining this concept in more detail;
for no departure from the concept used in classical statistics is required.
What is changed, and radically changed, is the method for calculating probabilities. [...]” R.
Feynman and A. Hibbs ([26], p.3)
16For a detailed discussion see [22].
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Feynman and Hibbs discuss the notion of probability, relying for it, only on the relation between mea-
surement outcomes. The problem seems to end up by avoiding a deeper analysis of the physical meaning
of probability. On the contrary, we understand the physical notion of probability as a gnoseological con-
cept which has in its heart very definite presuppositions, the most important of which regards existence.
Erwin Scho¨dinger wrote a letter to Einstein exactly about this point many years ago:
“It seems to me that the concept of probability is terribly mishandled these days. Probability
surely has as its substance a statement as to whether something is or is not the case —an uncertain
statement, to be sure. But nevertheless it has meaning only if one is indeed convinced that the
something in question quite definitely is or is not the case. A probabilistic assertion presupposes the
full reality of its subject.” E. Schro¨dinger ([9], p.115)
Of course the founding fathers of quantum mechanics clearly understood the departure of quantum
probability with respect to its classical meaning, but most importantly, that this departure precluded the
possibility to maintain our classical conception of the world.
“[...] the paper of Bohr, Kramers and Slater revealed one essential feature of the correct in-
terpretation of quantum theory. This concept of the probability wave was something entirely new
in theoretical physics since Newton. Probability in mathematics or in statistical mechanics means a
statement about our degree of knowledge of the actual situation. In throwing dice we do not know
the fine details of the motion of our hands which determine the fall of the dice and therefore we say
that the probability for throwing a special number is just one in six. The probability wave function
of Bohr, Kramers and Slater, however, meant more than that; it meant a tendency for something. It
was a quantitative version of the old concept of ‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced
something standing in the middle between the idea of an event ant the actual event, a strange kind
of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.” W. Heisenberg ([32], p.42,
emphasis added)
In relation to the impossibility of providing an ignorance interpretation of the elements present in
the quantum formalism I would also like to call the attention to the well known distinction provided by
Bernard D’Espagnat in his book, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics [16], between proper and
impropermixtures. D’Espagnat shows that a mixture which is obtained from a pure quantum state cannot
be interpreted in terms of ignorance without getting into contradictions. The mixtures which one obtains
by tracing degrees of freedom from an original pure state, even though present exactly the same formal
structure than a “common”, “proper” mixture, cannot be supplemented with an ignorance interpretation
of its terms. D’Espagnat calls these quantum mixtures improper, in contraposition to classical mixtures
which are called proper. I regard this as one of the most important conceptual developments of the last
decades, its importance has to do with the possibility of understanding better, on the one hand, what
we do mean when we talk about a ‘quantum mixture’, and on the other hand, the impossibilities of the
quantum formalism to provide an account of an actual state of affairs.
However, not only the notion of probability, but also that of possibility finds within the formal structure
of quantum theory serious inconveniences to relate itself closely to our classical understanding. In [19]
and [20], together with Graciela Domenech and Hector Freytes we applied algebraic and topological tools
in order to study the structure of the orthomodular lattice of actual propositions enriched with modal
propositions. In this work we developed the following frame: If L is an orthomodular lattice and L a
Boolean saturated orthomodular one such that L can be embedded in L, we say that L is a modal
extension of L. Given L and a modal extension L, we define the possibility space as the subalgebra of
L generated by {P : P ∈ L}. We denote by L this space and it may be proved that it is a Boolean
subalgebra of the modal extension. The possibility space represents the modal content added to the
discourse about properties of the system. We may define a global valuation over L(H) as the family of
Boolean homomorphisms (vi : Wi → 2)i∈I such that vi | Wi ∩Wj = vj | Wi ∩Wj for each i, j ∈ I,
being (Wi)i∈I the family of Boolean sublattices of L(H). This global valuation would give the values
of all magnitudes at the same time maintaining a compatibility condition in the sense that whenever
two magnitudes shear one or more projectors, the values assigned to those projectors are the same from
every context. Within this frame, the actualization of a possible property acquires a rigorous meaning.
If f : L → 2 is a Boolean homomorphism, an actualization compatible with f is a global valuation
(vi :Wi → 2)i∈I such that vi |Wi ∩L = f |Wi ∩L for each i ∈ I. Compatible actualizations represent
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the (logical) passage from possibility to actuality. When taking into account compatible actualizations
from different contexts, the following KS theorem for modalities can be proved [19]:
Theorem 2.2 Let L be an orthomodular lattice. Then L admits a global valuation iff for each possibility
space there exists a Boolean homomorphism f : L → 2 that admits a compatible actualization.
The modal KS (MKS) theorem shows that no enrichment of the orthomodular lattice with modal
propositions allows to circumvent the contextual character of the quantum language. As it has been
discussed in [23] a further conclusion which can be derived from the MKS theorem is that the formalism
of quantum mechanics does not only deny the possibility of talking about an ‘actual entity’, but even the
term ‘possible entity’ remains a meaningless notion within its domain of discourse.
2.3 Dirac’s Problematic Definition: ‘State of a System’
Dirac was obviously aware of the limitations imposed by quantum mechanics to our classical picture of
the world in terms of entities, this becomes evident from the preface to the first edition of his book, The
Principles of Quantum Mechanics:
“The methods of progress in theoretical physics have undergone a vast change during the present
century. The classical tradition has been to consider the world to be an association of observable
objects (particles, fluids, fields, etc.) moving about according to definite laws of force, so that one
could form a mental picture in space and time of the whole scheme. This led to a physicist whose aim
was to make assumptions about the mechanism and forces connecting these observable objects, to
account for their behaviour in the simplest possible way. It has become increasingly evident in recent
times, however, that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws do not govern the world
as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct way, but instead they control a substratum of
which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies.” P. Dirac (29 May 1930,
[15], preface to the first edition)
In the second edition of his book, Paul Dirac continues to analyze the relation between quantum
mechanics and classical concepts, coming to attack in this opportunity the notion of ‘state’ and its
possible meaning in the quantum formalism:17
“The main change [in the book] has been brought about by the use of the word ‘state’ in a
three-dimensional non-relativistic sense. It would seem at first sight a pity to build up the theory
largely on the basis of non-relativistic concepts. The use of the non-relativistic meaning of ‘state’,
however, contributes so essentially to the possibilities of clear exposition as to lead one to suspect that
the fundamental ideas of the present quantum mechanics are in need of serious alteration at just this
point, and that an improved theory would agree more closely with the development here given than
with a development which aims at preserving the relativistic meaning of ‘state’ throughout.” P. Dirac
(27 November 1934, [15], preface to the second edition)
At this point we are only interested in making clear the irrelevancy of the notion of ‘state of the
system’ in the scheme provided by quantum mechanics. David Finkelstein is someone who has also called
the attention of the fact that it would be better to do without this notion.
“One is liable to think that ‘the state of the system’ is an indispensable element of the quantum
theory, simply because it is found in many expositions. Even the founding fathers, who knew better,
occasionally lapsed into phrases like ‘the state of the system,’ though in contexts that made it clear
that they did not attribute physical reality to the construct. To make it explicit that there is no
longer room or need for this construct in quantum physics, we review here a formulation which avoids
it from the start. All of this is at least implicit and often explicit in the writings of Heisenberg and
Bohr.” D. Fikelstein ([28], p.2)
What is important to notice is that the notion of ‘state’ goes together with the idea of ‘object’, it has
only meaning when presupposing the existence of something which has such ‘state’, that is why one talks
about ‘the state of a system’. But, as we saw above, there is no absolute state of a system in quantum
17I wish to thank Carlo Rovelli for pointing out this important passage to me.
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mechanics, the state of the system exists (in actuality) only when the choice of the context has taken
place. Most importantly, the KS theorem makes clear the fact that it is not possible to think of this
choice as revealing a preexistent (actual) reality.
In order to find a way out, there are some approaches which point out that by relativizing concepts
one might be able to successfully interpret quantum mechanics. Such is the case of Carlo Rovelli who
presented the idea that one should reject the notion of: absolute state or observer independent state
of a system (observer-independent values of physical quantities). In his Relational Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics18 this notion is replaced in favor of: state relative to something. Rovelli argues
that the conclusion derives from the observation that the experimental evidence at the basis of quantum
mechanics forces us to accept that distinct observers give different descriptions of the same events.19 Also
David Finkelstein points out that one could advance in this direction.
“Quantum theory was consciously and explicitly modelled on special relativity. The theory was
formulated operationally to free it of certain idols. The role that the Lorentz group plays in special
relativity is played by the unitary group in Dirac’s transformation theory of quantum theory. Quan-
tum theory relativized the construct of ‘the state of the system,’ implicitly absolute, and replaced it
by ‘the state of the system relative to this experimental frame.’ Nevertheless the construct of state
was still useful and is still used.[...]
The quantum relativity of the state seems to violate common sense even more than the classical
relativity of time, though it seems to agree well with experiment. Each person is pretty well-steeped
in both commutative logic and absolute time by the time he or she encounters quantum theory and
special relativity. Every generation will have to go through these processes of relativizing the concepts
of time and state and of who knows what else to come.” D. Finkelstein ([28], p.2)
We certainly agree that in some cases the idea of relativizing concepts has been of great help to find
a way out, and indeed this has worked out very well in the history of physics. It is also true that by
relativizing the concepts of space and time Einstein was able to produce a new conception of physical
reality. However, the point we would like to make clear is that one cannot relativize the idea of entity in
the way it is done in quantum mechanics and go away with it, because, if we do so, everything which is
left behind looses its meaning.
The similarities between quantum mechanics and relativity theory are certainly interesting but the
most important thing to learn abut their relation is their difference, the distance between them. Even
Niels Bohr discussed the common features of both relativity and quantum mechanics trying to find a
valuable analogy which would help understanding quantum theory. As commented by Max Jammer, in
1929 Bohr compared in three different aspects his approach in quantum mechanics with Einstein’s theory
of relativity:
“[...] Concerning the first two points of comparison Bohr was certainly right. But as to the third
point of comparison, based on the assertion that relativity theory reveals ‘the subjective character
of all concepts of classical physics’ or, as Bohr declared again in the fall of 1929 in an address
in Copenhagen, that ‘the theory of relativity remind us of the subjective character of all physical
phenomena, a character which depends essentially upon the motion of the observer,’ [...] Bohr
overlooked that the theory of relativity is also a theory of invariants and that, above all, its notion
of ‘events,’ such as the collision of two particles, denotes something absolute, entirely independent of
the reference frame of the observer and hence logically prior to the assignment of metrical attributes.”
M. Jammer ([37], p.132, emphasis added)
In special relativity one can still talk about an actual reality, there are events and these events can be
interpreted as existing regardless of being or not being observed. In special relativity the mathematical
structure which relates events in space-time allows (through the invariants present in the theory) to retain
an objective picture of physical reality. However, this is not the case when we relativize the notion of
state of a system in quantum mechanics, because by doing this, we are relativizing the very notion of
physical reality. We have argued that this cannot be accepted in physics whose basic presupposition is
that something like physical reality, call it Nature, exists. By relativizing the idea of state of a system
not only the idea of system losses its meaning but even the the notion of physics losses its content.
18This interpretation was exposed in [57].
19This interpretation of Rovelli has been discussed in detail in [54].
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Even though we agree with Carlo Rovelli and David Finkelstein in the important point that the notion
of ‘state of a system’ is superfluous in quantum mechanics, we disagree in what should be done in this
respect. In this point we propose a radical move, the extreme consequence we need to derive from this
problem is not to relativize, but to forget completely about the notion of ‘state of the system’. The
definition provided by Dirac is the seed of the interpretational problems which will be later evidenced in
different levels. As recalled by Rovelli himself: “Heisenberg’s insistence on the fact that the lesson to be
taken from the atomic experiments is that we should stop thinking of the ‘state of the system’, has been
obscured by the subsequent terse definition of the theory in terms of states given by Dirac.”20 Talking
about a state of a system is nothing but presupposing that quantum mechanics talks about entities.
The idea that there are such systems (entities) reminds us of the Socratic questioning upon which one
is already trapped if one tries to answer from the structure delivered by the question itself. It is the
presupposed structure of the question which limits the possibilities of providing an answer. If one tries
to answer the question from within the hidden structure one gets into a labyrinth, and hunted by the
Minotaur one is sure to dye inside. But we, we have the thread of Ariadna (our classical language), a
thread which we should not overestimate (as a fundamental path). We must remain suspicious because
scientist we are. We must be cautious as the thread might constitute the labyrinth itself. The thread
might hide the possibilities to create new paths, a new way of understanding the problem. We have to use
the thread not to get out, just by pulling in the one side, but rather by using it to view the distinctions,
the differences, and in this way understand the labyrinth. We have to escape not by finding a secrete
path hidden in the formalism but rather by elevating ourselves by means of abstraction. We have to
create a way out.
3 The Concept of ‘Entity’ as an Epistemological Obstruction
Even though we recognize its importance in occidental thought, we believe that the idea of entity ap-
pears, in the context of quantum mechanics as, what Gaston de Bachelard [4] calls, an epistemological
obstruction; i.e. an idea which restricts our possibilities to imagine the physics provided by quantum
mechanics. Quantum mechanics is the first physical theory which provides a clear example of the impos-
sibility of interpreting its formalism subsumed by the idea of entity. Maybe this is why von Weizsa¨cker
wrote that “[in quantum theory] the dissolution of the traditional concepts such as space, time, matter,
determination, produces in every man which seriously confronts it, in the first place, the feeling of being
confronted with nothingness.”21 Quantum mechanics stands in the limits of an abysm, the radicalness of
its conceptual break through is still today not completely acknowledged. Quantum theory tackles once
and again the conception of physical entity, and with it, all of our classical worldview. Our language
is entangled with our classical conception of the world, a world which is expressed in terms of subject,
object, predicate, etc. It is this same language which exposes the limits of our world. Quantum mechanics
stands beyond this specific conceptualization, waiting for a new language which can express its power.
In order to make experiments we need the idea of ‘objects’ (particles, apparatus, photographic plates,
etc.), so in a particular sense the connection between quantum mechanics and classical physics seems quite
direct. The paradox appears when we do not recognize that even though we use a classical apparatus the
experiments that we perform when considering elementary particles are not part of our classical experience.
The presuppositions we make, already by using the quantum formalism, go completely against the idea
of physical reality as constituted by entities (particles, apparatus, photographic plates, etc.). It is this
conjunction which cannot be resolved. Each principle of Aristotelian logic which is at the basis of our
understanding becomes rotten in the quantum formalism. As a matter of fact, all the discussions regarding
the interpretation of quantum mechanics explicitly or implicitly refer to the impossibility of thinking in
classical terms. Quantum mechanics deconstructs the conceptual scheme provided by classical physics
and with it, the particles, the apparatuses, the photographic plates and whatever object that we might
use to perform a measurement.
The structure of thought which we use in classical physics is that guided by classical Aristotelian logic
and its principles, however, the formalism of quantum mechanics and its experience seems to contradict
each one of them. Quantum mechanics places new principles such as indetermination, complementarity
and superposition. An important point regards the interpretation of such principles in terms of, either
20Quoted from [57], p.19.
21Quoted from [64], p. 247, our translation.
15
providing ‘consistent knowledge of classical experience’ or, as providing ‘the structure of thought of a
completely new experience’, that one expressed by quantum theory.
3.1 Indetermination Instead of Existence
Werner Heisenberg [31] presented in 1927 one of the most important papers of the 20th century. In
this paper called: Uber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanic, the
principle of existence and its direct relation to actuality was attacked through a set of indeterminacy
relations. As a first characterization we might say that the principle of indetermination expresses the
impossibility of assigning exact simultaneous values to the position and momentum of a particle. Ac-
cording to Heisenberg the properties are not determined until the measurement has taken place, there is
no actual state of affairs related to the evolution of the quantum wave function, or in his own words: “I
believe that one can formulate the emergence of the classical ‘path’ of a particle pregnantly as follows: the
‘path’ comes into being only because we observe it.”. As recalled by Heisenberg himself it was Einstein’s
recommendation which guided him:
“[In the transformation theory by Dirac and Jordan] one could transform from ψ(q) to ψ(p), and
it was natural to assume that the square |ψ(p)|2 would be the probability to find the electron with
momentum p. So gradually one acquired the notion that the square of the wave function, which by
the way was not the wave function in three-dimensional space but in configuration space, meant the
probability for something. With this knowledge we returned to the electron in the cloud chamber.
Could it be that we had asked the wrong question? I remember Einstein telling me, ‘it is always
the theory which decides what can be observed.’ And that meant, if it was taken seriously, that we
should not ask: ‘How can we represent the path of the electron in the cloud chamber?’ We should ask
instead: ‘Is it not perhaps true that in nature only such situations occur which can be represented
in quantum mechanics or wave mechanics?” W. Heisenberg ([34], p.269)
If taken to its last consequences, Einstein’s recommendation means that ‘the theory’ expresses the con-
ditions of possibility to determine what is to be considered ‘experience’. Our conception of reality is
modeled in this way by the theory itself which determines the ontological and epistemological conditions
over which it provides ‘meaning’. It is the theory which determines the limits of what is to be considered
experience and physical reality. If we accept that “there are no facts without a theory”, in quantum
mechanics it is meaningless to say that the quantum system, conceived in terms of the the wave func-
tion, possesses a set of definite properties. Properties which exist (in actuality) regardless of weather we
observe them or not. Heisenberg’s principle, if taken seriously, this is, in terms of an ontological interpre-
tation, has nothing to do with ignorance. Unfortunately, Bohr’s pressure to subsume this principle within
his own complementary scheme forced the subsequent gnoseological discussions in terms of experimental
impossibilities [30].
Even though Heisenberg had started by analyzing experiments, after having found a consistent way
of recovering “the observed” through his mathematical scheme of matrix mechanics, he was stopped from
going further and taking this same principle as a guiding line to determine future experience. Heisenberg,
returned in his footsteps and remained within the limits imposed by classicality. Instead of taking his
principle along the ontological road of Einstein, Heisenberg followed Bohr’s gnoseological path. Such trip
had no other goal than to justify quantum theory from the heights of classical thought. The pressure of
Bohr can be read in the “Addition in Proof” to Heisenberg’s foundational paper:
“After the conclusion of the forgoing paper, more recent investigations of Bohr have led to a point
of view which permits an essential deepening and sharpening of the analysis of quantum-mechanical
correlations attempted in this work. In this connection Bohr has brought to my attention that I
have overlooked essential points in the course of several discussions in this paper. Above all, the
uncertainty in our observation does not arise exclusively from the occurrence of discontinuities, but
is tied directly to the demand that we ascribe equal validity to the quite different experiments which
show up in corpuscular theory in the one hand, and in the wave theory in the other hand. [...] I owe
great thanks to Professor Bohr for sharing with me at an early stage the results of these more recent
investigations of his-to appear soon in a paper on the conceptual structure of quantum theory- and
for discussing them with me.” W. Heisenberg ([31] quoted from [66], p.83)
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Niels Bohr considered the wave-particle duality present in the double slit experiment (section 6.1) as
expressing the most important character of quantum theory. What Bohr had in mind, as we shall see
later, was to resolve this duality through the principle of complementarity. Bohr’s agenda was focused in
fulfilling the consistency requirements of the quantum formalism to apply the well known classical scheme,
the discussions which followed took Heisenberg’s principle only as providing the limits of certainty. The
classical scheme would then remain that which secured the knowledge provided by quantum theory, and
analogously, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations that which secured the knowledge provided by the more
general principle of complementarity.
“Bohr wanted to pursue the epistemological analysis one step further [than Heisenberg], and in
particular to understand the logical nature of the mutual exclusion of the aspects opposed in the
particle-wave dualism. From this point of view the indeterminacy relations appear in a new light.
[...] The indeterminacy relations are therefore essential to ensure the consistency of the theory, by
assigning the limits within which the use of classical concepts belonging to the two extreme pictures
may be applied without contradiction. For this novel logical relationship, which called in Bohr’s mind
echoes of his philosophical meditations over the duality of our mental activity, he proposed the name
‘complementarity’, conscious that he was here breaking new ground in epistemology.” L. Rosenfeld
([66], p.59)
Pekka Lahti proved in his thesis [40] that Heisenberg’s principle is logically independent of Bohr’s
principle of complementarity. Today, we have more elements to make precise the relation between these
principles. Firstly, it is important to notice that Heisenberg’s relations can be derived directly from the
mathematical scheme of the theory, as a direct consequence of the quantum postulate. At first sight it
might seem that the denial of the existence of properties which are not “observed” has an operational
ground, and this might have been the case, however, we believe the most important consequence can
be derived if this move is read from somewhat different angle. The droplets in the cloud chamber
show that that which we observe appears and disappears. When one sees something one is accustomed
to say that that which is observed is “actually (in reality) there”, but what is the mode of being of
something which disappears, of something which is not present in actuality? This is the problem which
Heisenberg encountered. If taken through the lines of thought of Einstein himself, acknowledging that in
physics “there is no difference between observable and non-observable”, Heisenberg’s principle appears
in a completely new light, referring to a different mode of existence to that of actuality.
However, following Bohr’s recommendation, Heisenberg’s principle was interpreted in terms of igno-
rance, as uncertainty, and even explained through a set of ‘gedankenexperiments’ which were expressions
of an experimental impossibility—in contraposition to an analysis over the conditions which make possible
the form of experience demanded by the theory. But as noted by Jaan Hilgevoord and Joos Uffink: “[...]it
is remarkable that in his later years Heisenberg put a somewhat different gloss on his relations. In his
autobiography Der Teil und das Ganze of 1969 he described how he had found his relations inspired by a
remark by Einstein that ‘it is the theory which decides what one can observe’ —thus giving precedence
to theory above experience, rather than the other way around.” Most interestingly for us is the fact that
“Some years later he even admitted that his famous discussions of thought experiments were actually
trivial since ‘[...] if the process of observation itself is subject to the laws of quantum theory, it must be
possible to represent its result in the mathematical scheme of this theory’.”22
To take quantum mechanics seriously is to believe that quantum mechanics expresses some feature of
reality and not only a consistent discourse which allows us to analyze experiments expressed in terms of
classical mechanics. The algorithmic conception of quantum mechanics as providing results of measure-
ment outcomes goes completely against the very idea of doing physics. At this point we choose to remain
close to the meaning provided by the principle itself. If we think that quantum mechanics is telling some-
thing about the world, if we think that it expresses an objective account of physical reality, we are then
forced to understand Heisenberg’s principle in terms of a mode of being, in terms of indetermination.
The indetermination principle lyes parallel to the principle of existence (of classical logic) but stating
something completely different. The principle of indetermination refers to the mode of existence of
properties in quantum mechanics, it states that the properties of a quantum system remain indetermined,
in the potential form of the being. Potentiality and indetermination are concepts which stand side by
side, just like actuality and determination. If we regard quantum theory as saying something about the
22Quoted from [35].
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world, Heisenberg’s principle should remain an ontological presupposition for experience as expressed by
quantum theory, this is why we have stated several times in the past that quantum mechanics creates a
new experience.
3.2 Complementarity Instead of Non-Contradiction
At the same time that Heisenberg had produced his indetermination principle, Niels Bohr appeared in
the scene with a principle of his own: the principle of complementarity. It is, at least, not completely
obvious what Bohr meant with this principle:
“Complementarity is no system, no doctrine with ready-made precepts. There is no via regia to it;
no formal definition of it can be found in Bohr’s writings, and this worries many people. [...] Bohr was
content to teach by example. He often evoked the thinkers of the past who had intuitively recognized
dialectical aspects of existence and endeavored to give them poetical or philosophical expression.” L.
Rosenfeld ([66], p.85).
Even though we regard this indefinite exposure as the richness itself of Bohr’s discourse, for our immediate
proposes we will discuss the possibility of limiting the meaning of complementarity.23 Bohr’s main discus-
sion related directly to the problem of objectivity, complementarity was meant here as a general regulative
principle which would allow to discuss consistently mutually incompatible experimental arrangements.
Bohr’s starting point was the wave-particle duality and the idea that: “We must, in general, be prepared
to accept the fact that a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points
of view which defy a unique description.”24 For the description of certain atomic phenomena we need
a ‘particle picture’ while for others we need a ‘wave picture’, using both pictures simultaneously leads
to contradictions. According to Bohr, it is the idea of complementarity, as a regulative principle, which
allows to secure the consistency of knowledge and to recover an objective description of physical reality.
“On the lines of objective description [I advocate using] the word phenomenon to refer only to
observations under circumstances whose description includes an account of the whole experimental
arrangement. In such terminology, the observational problem in quantum physics is deprived of any
special intricacy and we are, moreover, directly reminded that every atomic phenomenon is closed in
the sense that its observation is based on registrations obtained by means of suitable amplification
devices with irreversible functioning such as, for example, permanent marks on a photographic plate,
caused by the penetration of electrons into the emulsion. In this connection, it is important to realize
that the quantum-mechanical formalism permits well defined applications referring only to such closed
phenomena.” N. Bohr ([66], p.3)
The definition of phenomenon relied for Bohr in the use of classical language, this was the limit which
even quantum mechanics had to respect. Bohr sustained the idea that: “it would be a misconception to
believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of
classical physics by new conceptual forms.”25 For us, complementarity, rather than unifying, expresses the
fact that one cannot put together incompatible experience of one and the same object through classical
ideas. But then, we come back to our point of departure, what does it mean to have one and the same
object?
Complementarity circumvents the principle of non-contradiction, but makes explicit at the same time
its exclusion from classical logic. Its relation to paraconsistent logics has been discussed by Newton da
Costa and De`cio Krause in their article The logic of complementarity (see also [13]).
23As noted by Pekka Lahti in [40], p.801, “In reading Bohr’s writings one may easily form the impression that the notion
of complementarity does appear in many different connections. However, one can distinguish between four categories of
statements which cover most uses of this notion. These are the following: (a) complementarity as a relation between
descriptions. like space-time description and causal description, (b) complementarity as a relationship between elementary
physical concepts, like position and momentum, (c) complementarity of the particle picture and the wave picture, and (d)
complementarity as a relationship between phenomena demanding mutually exclusive experimental arrangements. [...] It
seems to us that in developing his viewpoint of complementarity Bohr gradually shifted the emphasis from category (a) to
category (b), and ultimately ‘unified’ the first three seemingly different notions of complementarity under the appearing in
the category (d).”
24Quoted from [7], emphasis added.
25Quoted from [66], p.7.
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“[...] it is perfectly reasonable to regard complementary aspects as incompatible, in the sense that
their combination into a single description may lead to difficulties. But in a theory grounded on
standard logic, the conjunction of two theses is also a thesis; in other words, if α and β are both
theses or theorems of a theory (founded on classical logic), then α∧ β is also a thesis (or a theorem)
of that theory. This is what we intuitively mean when we say that, on the grounds of classical logic, a
true proposition cannot exclude another true proposition. In this sense, the quantum world is rather
distinct from the classical, for although complementary propositions are to be regarded as acceptable,
their conjunction seems to be not.” N. da Costa and D. Krause ([12], p.5)
Even though it is clear that complementarity stands outside the limits imposed by classical thought,
a main point of discussion regards its relation to classical ideas, and thus, the question of what is a
proper interpretation of this principle? Niels Bohr’s ideas were focused in respecting the basic pillars of
classical thought. Through his gnoselogical interpretation the complementarity principle was understood
as providing the constrains for a consistent classical discourse, being applied to the relation between
classical representations. Contrary to this idea, we propose to consider the principle of complementarity
from an ontological stance, not simply relating classical schemes, but rather as providing the logical
constitution of the relation between quantum-properties. This deeper interpretation of the principle
determines a new reality, as expressed by quantum mechanics, independent of classical physics. We will
come back to this in section 5.1.
3.3 Superposition Instead of Identity
The concept of identity sinked as well in the waves of the quantum formalism. Erwin Schro¨dinger was
very clear about this departure:
“I mean this: that the elementary particle is not an individual; it cannot be identified, it lacks
‘sameness.’ [...] The implication, far from obvious, is that the unsuspected epithet ‘this’ is not quite
properly applicable to, say, an electron, except with caution, in a restricted sense, and sometimes not
at all.” E. Schro¨dinger ([60], p.197)
However, even though Schro¨dinger was radical enough to proclaim the loss of identity in quantum
mechanics, he remained within the entity conception of thought. He clearly understood that the notion of
identity was left aside, but he would still remain within the linguistic structure determined by the notion of
‘elementary particle’ —constituting another paradox in relation to classical thought— providing meaning
to the concept of ‘entity’ with no ‘identity’.26
The notion of identity in quantum mechanics has been discussed mainly in relation to the problem
of indistinguishable particles, as it is well known the way in which we count elementary particles is not
classical, permutations of particles are not taken into account and thus, the statistics change drastically.
However, we believe that this is only a very specific aspect of a larger problem which can be envisaged
from different angles [23]. Another way of looking at the problem of identity is through the notion of
superposition, whose mathematical structure cannot be subsumed into the notion of ‘identity’. From a
classical viewpoint it is not possible to bring together something and its opposite, it makes no sense to
talk about an identity which possesses contraries. A superposition reflects one of the strangest characters
of the quantum, presenting clear constrains to a classical interpretation. We still have to answer the
question: what is a superposition? We will come back to this problem later in section 5.2 and 6.2.
3.4 Ontology Instead of Gnoseology
So why should we talk about entities if every single principle which structures this idea seems to vanish in
the quantum formalism? The answer is simple: our language is bounded by this same structure; and like
Bohr used to say many times: “we are suspended in language”. However, contrary to Bohr who stated
that no conceptual development would help us in solving the problems into which quantum mechanics
confronts us, we think that the development of new thought-forms can certainly provide the missing piece
of the puzzle; i.e. a complete elucidation of the meaning of quantum theory [52].
The principle of indetermination (instead of the principle of existence), the principle of complemen-
tarity (instead of the principle of non-contradiction) and the principle of superposition (instead of the
26This will be discussed more closely in [53], see also [39].
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principle of identity) should configure this new thought forms, which must later turn into a complete
language. It is through this new language that we must recover an ontological account of quantum me-
chanics. In order to go further we must go back to Einstein’s ontological concern. If quantum mechanics
is to be understood as providing a picture of physical reality we must avoid Bohr’s gnoseological trap
and continue to interpret each principle of quantum mechanics as giving us access to the real.
In the following diagram we present a short review of the related concepts:
Gnoseological Interpretation Ontological Interpretation
Heisenberg’s Regulates complementarity. Constitutive principle.
relations/principle Constrains of knowledge Determines the mode of existence
Bohr’s about properties. of q-properties.
UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS PRINCIPLE OF INDETERMINATION
Bohr’s Regulative principle. Constitutive principle.
relations/principle How classical representations relate. How q-properties relate.
COMPLEMENTARITY RELATIONS PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
Superposition Mathematical algorithmic device. Constitutive principle.
state/principle No image. Explained in terms of faculties (sec. 5.2).
MATHEMATICAL STATE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERPOSITION
We believe that, as it stands, quantum theory still makes reference directly or indirectly to entities,
but then we must acknowledge —from a direct analysis of the mathematical formulation of the theory—
that this entities are created through our choices. Quantum mechanics, if talking about entities, is closer
to a theory which describes what we imagine, and oops... that which we imagine turns out to be reality!
We need to develop a new ontology which can bring into stage that of which quantum mechanics is
talking about, the understanding of the principles in terms of providing the ontological background of
the theory needs to be reconsidered.
4 Actuality vs. Potentiality or Classical vs. Quantum
The first philosophers believed in the existence of physis, contrary to the Sophists who believed in the
laws of man and the polis, these so called physicists, placed the fundament of thought in Nature. The
most important problem physicists had to deal with was that exposed by two pre-Socratic thinkers known
by the names of Heraclitus and Parmenides, roughly speaking: what is movement?
The received view presents these pre-Socratic thinkers as approaching the problem from two, seemingly
opposed positions. Hercalitus of Elea, stated the theory of flux, a doctrine of permanent motion and
unstability in the world. The consequences of this doctrine were, as both Plato and Aristotle stressed
repeatedly, the impossibility to develop stable, certain knowledge about the world, for an object, changing
each instant, does not allow for even to be named with certainty, let alone to be ‘known’, i.e., assigned
fixed, objective characteristics. Parmenides was placed at the opposite side, teaching the non-existence
of motion and change in reality, reality being absolutely One, and being absolutely Being.27 Aristotle
solved the problem by presupposing a certain stability of the Being, structuring a set of principles, as
those which governed thought and Nature. The principles of existence, identity and non-contradiction,
constitute the basic structure of the idea of entity as that of which reality is constituted in actuality.
However, the structure created by these logical and ontological principles was completely statical, no
movent or becoming could arise from it, this is why Aristotle was in need of God, a first mover which he
characterized as being in pure acto. The importance of the concept of potentiality, which was first placed
by Aristotle in equal footing to actuality, was soon diminished. The choice to conceive the immobile
motor as pure acto determined the fate of western thought through the path of actuality. Potentiality
became mere possibility, and thought only in relation to the latter, its conception, as a different mode of
the being, was soon forgotten.
27Contrary to the orthodox view, one could state however following K. Verelst and B. Coecke [63], that: “[...] the
‘contradiction’ seen by classical philosophy between Heraclitus and Parmenides is not necessarily a correct understanding of
the earlier ‘philosophies’. One could as well infer that Heraclitus and Parmenides do articulate the same world-experience,
the former as the experience of reality over a lapse of time, the latter as the experience of the absolute reality of this
moment.”
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4.1 Classical Mechanics as a Theory of the Actual
The idea of regarding actuality as the real continued to rule not only in philosophy but also in physics.
However, it was only through the development of the continuous by Leibnitz and Newton, that it was
possible to extend the physical conception of actuality into a closed mathematical formulation. Classical
mechanics is the final stage of a complete theory which studies entities which exist in the mode of
being of actuality. Within this description everything becomes determined and actual. The statement
of Parmenides, can be extended in time, and that which is will remain, that which is not will never be.
Classical Newtonian mechanics is the final stage of the long trip initiated by Plato and Aristotle, the
mathematical structure of the Principia the actual story of the world, physics, the theory of actuality.
In the 20th century the socratic questioning remained still present through the structure of classical
thought which made impossible to express anything which was not the case, which was not actual. Even
Heisenberg, who was the first to propose to think in terms of ‘potentia’ remained prisoner of the old
idol, and phrases like “strange kind of physical reality”, “vague connection with reality” or “not as
real” accompanied the negative characterization of potentiality always thought in terms of actuality. For
the founding fathers of quantum mechanics, the idea of actuality remained a ghost, which appeared and
reappeared each time they looked away from her site. As self reminders of the history of western thought,
one can find through the passages of their writings, long shadows of actuality which continue to our days.
“Reality resists imitation trough a model. So one lets go of naive realism and leans directly on
the indubitable proposition that actually (for the physicist) after all is said and done there is only
observation, measurement. Then all our physical thinking thenceforth has the sole basis and as sole
object the results of measurements which can in principle be carried out, for we must now explicitly
not relate our thinking any longer to any kind of reality or to a model. All numbers arising in our
physical calculations must be interpreted as measurement results. But since we didn’t just now come
into the world and start to build up our science from scratch, but rather have in use a quite definite
scheme of calculation, from which in view of the great progress in Q.M. we would less than ever
want to be parted, we see ourselves forced to dictate from writing-table which measurements are in
principle possible, that is, must be possible in order to support adequately our reckoning system.” E.
Schro¨dinger ([59], p.156)
‘Observation’ and ‘measurement results’, which is the way by which the physicists experience that
which is actual, that which is the case, are always necessary involved with the description provided by
the theory. The concept of object is a creation, which works fairly well in our classical world. But, as
Einstein told to Heisenberg “it is only the theory which can tell you what can be observed.” What is
important to notice is that only entities, which exist in the mode of being of actuality, can be observed
in classical physics. That ‘entities exist in the world’ is not a discovery of classical physics, but its basic
assumption.
“The classical tradition has been to consider the world to be an association of observable objects
(particles, fluids, fields, etc.) moving about according to definite laws of force, so that one could form
a mental picture in space and time of the whole scheme.” P. Dirac ([15], preface to the first edition,
emphasis added)
Let us be clear about this point: one never observes objects as such. An object is a conceptual
machinery which is able to unify our perceptions. It is a mental structure which is presupposed in every
experience which takes place in the domain of classical thought. One does not encounter objects in the
world, one presupposes their existence and this allows us to create experience, an experience which is
for us, as physicists, an expression of reality. Closer to our days we find in Bas van Fraassen a strong
defender of actuality.
“To be an empiricist is to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, observable
phenomena, and to recognize no objective modality in nature. To develop an empiricist account of
science is to depict it as involving a search for truth only about the empirical world, about what is
actual and observable. Since scientific activity is an enormously rich and complex cultural phenom-
enon, this account of science must be accompanied by auxiliary theories about scientific explanation,
conceptual commitment, modal language, and much else. But it must involve throughout a resolute
rejection of the demand for an explanation of the regularities in the observable course of nature, by
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means of truths concerning a reality beyond what is actual and observable, as a demand which plays
no role in the scientific enterprise.” B. van Fraassen ([62], pp.202-203, emphasis added)
For us, there is no representable ‘actual’ account of the world voided of description. Actuality, when
represented, is not left without strong presuppositions. Representation takes place through concepts and
one must presuppose entities to even talk about such actuality. A direct access to actuality presents
us with unavoidable paradoxes as a world of pure sensation remains outside the limits of language and
expression. Irineo Funes, as recalled by Jorge Luis Borges, had thought of such a language but left it
aside for obvious reasons:
“Locke, en el siglo XVII, postulo´ (y reprobo´) un idioma imposible en el que cada cosa individual,
cada piedra, cada pa´jaro y cada rama tuviera un nombre propio; Funes proyecto´ alguna vez un
idioma ana´logo, pero lo desecho´ por parecerle demasiado general, demasiado ambiguo. En efecto,
Funes no so´lo recordaba cada hoja de cada a´rbol de cada monte, sino cada una de las veces que la
hab´ıa percibido o imaginado. Resolvio´ reducir cada una de sus jornadas prete´ritas a unos setenta mil
recuerdos, que definir´ıa luego por cifras. Lo disuadieron dos consideraciones: la conciencia de que la
tarea era interminable, la conciencia de que era inu´til. Penso´ que en la hora de la muerte no habr´ıa
acabado de clasificar todos los recuerdos de la nin˜ez.
Los dos proyectos que he indicado (un vocabulario infinito para la serie natural de los nu´meros,
un inu´til cata´logo mental de todas las ima´genes del recuerdo) son insensatos, pero revelan cierta
balbuciente grandeza. Nos dejan vislumbrar o inferir el vertiginoso mundo de Funes. E´ste, no lo
olvidaremos, era casi incapaz de ideas generales, plato´nicas. No so´lo le costaba comprender que el
simbolo gene´rico perro abarcaba tantos individuos dispares de diversos taman˜os y diversa forma; le
molestaba que el perro de las tres y catorce (visto de perfil) tuviera el mismo nombre que el perro de
las tres y cuarto (visto de frente). [...]
Hab´ıa aprendido sin esfuerzo el ingle´s, el france´s, el portugue´s, el lat´ın. Sospecho, sin embargo, que
no era muy capaz de pensar. Pensar es olvidar diferencias, es generalizar, abstraer. En el abarrotado
mundo de Funes no hab´ıa sino detalles, casi inmediatos.” J. L. Borges ([8], pp.489-490)
For us there are no ‘naked facts’, a phenomenon comes from the synthesis between the description —
which determines the conditions of possibility to access a certain aspect of the Being— and experimental
observation (the Being as exposed by the description). These two elements interact with no preponderance
of one over the other, they are regarded by reality like two mirrors with nothing in between.
For more than one century we have been looking at the theory through an eyehole, we have seen only
that which goes through the door of actuality. We believe that potentiality, conceived as a different mode
of the being, is the key which might allow us to enter the quantum domain.
4.2 Quantum Mechanics as a Theory of the Potential
The concept of potentiality has occupied a fundamental position in the history of occidental thought. Its
relation to actuality has been one of the first, and maybe, still unresolved problems in western philosophy.
The common idea is that the real is reducible to that which is ‘actual’, from this position the conception
of a ‘potential non-actual’ is denied. Aristotle criticized the Megarians who stated that potentiality only
exists in actuality, his logic, however, was interpreted following these same steps.
Quantum mechanics was developed from a critical revision to the idea of preexistence and it is in this
very sense that it involves an attempt to escape the limitations imposed by the classical picture of the
world in terms of actuality. This departure was given by the mathematical language which Heisenberg
developed as a direct consequence of Planck’s quantum postulate. The philosophical guiding line was
already developed by Mach as a critical analysis of the metaphysical ideas of classical Newtonian mechan-
ics. Niels Bohr, contrary to Heisenberg and Pauli, wanted to save, above all, the classical description,
avoiding any type of conceptual development. According to him: “[...] the unambiguous interpretation
of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of the classical physical theories, and we may
say that in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of physics for all
time.” One might say that rather than “suspended in language” we are “stuck” in (classical) language.
Heisenberg and Pauli, contrary to Bohr, seeked for new means of expression. On the one hand, Wolf-
gang Pauli ([43], p.126) criticized the very categorical pre-conceptions involved in the Kantian scheme:
“We agree with P. Bernays in no longer regarding the special ideas, which Kant calls synthetic judgements
a priori, generally as the pre-conditions of human understanding, but merely as the special pre-conditions
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of the exact science (and mathematics) of his age.” His path was to study carefully the idea of space
and time in Alchemy and in Kepler’s writings, as he stated in a letter to Fierz on December 29, 1947:
“I find the time particularly interesting, when space and time were not yet up there and, indeed, the
moment precisely before this fateful operation. This is my reason for my study of Kepler.”28 Pauli was
seeking to develop the concept of reality, he certainly knew about the conceptual difficulty with which
he was dealing and saw in the idea of complementarity a way to regain a picture of the world.29 Werner
Heisenberg, on the other hand, developed the idea of potentia as read from the Timaeus of Plato.
“In the experiments about atomic events we have to do with things and facts, with phenomena
that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But atoms or the elementary particles are not
as real ; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts.” W.
Heisenberg ([32], p.160, emphasis added)
However, it is clear from his own writings that the idea of potentiality was still thought in terms of
actuality, as mere possibility. This interpretation steams form the orthodox reading of Aristotle which
does not take into account the ontological aspect of potentiality as a mode of the being, independent of
actuality. Continuing the path laid down by Pauli and Heisenberg the problem which we propose to
resolve is the following: how is it possible to think the real in terms of potentiality? It is clear for us
however that the orthodox interpretation of potentiality has clear limitations.
“Aristotle [...] created the important concept of potential being and applied it to hyle. [...] This
is where an important differentiation in scientific thinking came in. Aristotle’s further statements on
matter cannot really be applied in physics, and it seems to me that much of the confusion in Aristotle
steams from the fact that being by far the less able thinker, he was completely overwhelmed by Plato.
He was not able to fully carry out his intention to grasp the potential , and his endeavors became
bogged down in early stages.” W. Pauli ([44], p.93)
We believe it was Pauli who had most clearly seen this path, as noted in a letter to Carl Gustav Jung
dated 27 February 1953:
“Science today has now, I believe, arrived at a stage where it can proceed (albeit in a way as yet
not at all clear) along the path laid down by Aristotle. The complementarity characteristics of the
electron (and the atom) (wave and particle) are in fact “potential being,” but one of them is always
“actual nonbeing.” That is why one can say that science, being no longer classical, is for the first
time a genuine theory of becoming and no longer Platonic.” W. Pauli ([44], p.93, emphasis added)
4.3 Classical Potentiality vs. Ontological Potentiality
The idea of regarding actuality as the real is a heavy burden in western thought which comes already from
Aristotelian philosophy and its cosmology. In quantum mechanics the notion of potentiality was used for
the first time by Heisenberg, his interpretation was followed by several other approaches which maintained
the same idea of interpreting the quantum wave function as a tendency or propensity to become actual.30
All these interpretations relied directly on the concept of actuality, their problem has been to explain
how things become actual, this is why their definitions of potentiality or propensity find their limit in
the concept of actuality. In these interpretations actuality remains that which is real and potentiality a
secondary element by which one is able to explain the actual. From the very start of our investigation
we have taken distance from such approaches by distinguishing our own notion of potentiality which we
have called: ontological potentiality [49, 51]. In different opportunities we have stated that ontological
potentiality is a different ‘mode of the being’ to that expressed by actuality. According to us, the central
point of this concept is that it confronts us with the necessity of considering potentiality as ontologically
independent of actuality.
As a matter of fact, Aristotle himself had distinguished between two types of potentiality. Firstly,
he talked about a generic potentiality: the potentiality of a seed that can transform into a tree. It is
important to notice that this idea of potentiality presents actuality as its main goal, as a process which
28Quoted from [41], p.202.
29A possible development of this idea was investigated in [50, 51].
30Such are the interpretations of Henry Margenau, Karl Popper, Constantin Piron, Diederik Aerts and more recently by
Mauricio Sua´rez.
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finds its resolution in an actual state of affairs. ‘I have the potential possibility of raising my hand’ means
that either I will raise my hand or I will not. According to Agamben, this generical sense is not that which
interested Aristotle, who’s thought was concentrated in a different notion [3]. Aristotle was interested
in discussing potentiality as a mode of existence: the poet has the capacity of writing poems and of not
writing poems. It is not only the potentiality of doing this or that thing but also the potentiality of
not-doing, potentiality of not being, of not passing to the actual. What is potential is capable of being
and not being. This is the problem of potentiality: the problem of possessing a faculty. What do I mean
when I say “I can”, “I cannot”. Ontological potentiality is a mode of existence which expresses power to
do, and power not to do, pure action as well as pure inactivity.31
The notions of tendency and propensity are thought in terms of a process which has its final stage, its
goal, in actuality. In this sense, if they exist, it is only because of actuality, but they cannot be thought
without direct relation to the actual state of affairs. It must be clear that ontological potentiality is not
a tendency nor a propensity, its definition does not rely in any way to what will be the case in the future.
Ontological potentiality is, it exists in the present, here and now.
The concept of potentiality as a mode of existence has been used implicitly or explicitly in the
development of quantum mechanics. As noted by Heisenberg: “I believe that the language actually used
by physicists when they speak about atomic events produces in their minds similar notions as the concept
of ‘potentia’. So physicists have gradually become accustomed to considering the electronic orbits, etc.,
not as reality but rather as a kind of ‘potentia’.” (p.156) Maybe the most interesting example of an
implicit use of these ideas has been provided by Richard Feynmann in his path integral approach. Even
though Feynman talks about calculating probabilities, he thinks in terms of existent potentialities. Why,
if not, should we take into account the mutually incompatible paths of the electron in the double slit
experiment? His approach takes into account every path as existent in the mode of being of potentiality,
there where the constrains of actuality cannot be applied (see [26] section 1.3). We will return to this
point later in section 6.1.
5 The Quantum Wave Function in Terms of ‘Interacting Facul-
ties’
Concepts are creations, they are not God given. And just like the concept of ‘entity’ was created, it is in
principle possible to think in a different concept which could describe physical reality. Our investigation
has analyzed exactly this problem: how can we develop a concept which brings into stage that of which
quantum mechanics is talking about in terms of an objective account of physical reality? In order to
solve this problem we have introduced in [50, 51] the concept of ‘faculty’.
An experimental arrangement is nothing but the condition of possibility for an action to take place,
it creates the power to perform an experiment. In quantum mechanics we are faced with the choice of
mutually incompatible experimental arrangements, each of which expresses a given capability, this ‘power
to do’ is, according to us, something which exists in the world, it is this ‘ontological element’ what we call
a faculty. The principles of indetermination, complementarity and superposition determine the notion
and meaning of ‘faculties’, just like the principles of existence, non-contradiction and identity provide the
constraints for a proper determination of the concept of ‘entity’. Our aim in this section is to go deeper
into the quantum principles and explain more clearly, if possible, what do we mean with the concept of
‘faculty’.
5.1 The Mode of Being of Faculties: Indetermination and Complementarity
In order to understand what we mean by a faculty we need to have in mind two general rules which are not
so easy to follow. Firstly, we have to forget about a direct reference to entities, and even though language
forces us into this Socratic trap we should avoid from now on committing ourselves to this particular
view. Secondly, in order to avoid thinking in the old terms of potentiality, in terms of tendency, in terms
of possibility, we should always think of faculties as existents in the present tense, as an element of reality
31In this sense we have taken distance from Giorgio Agamben ([3], p.183) who provides a negative interpretation to
potentiality: “[...] ‘To have a faculty’ means to have a privation. And potentiality is not a logical hypostasis but the mode
of existence of this privation.” We wish to thank Fernando Gallego for the many discussions regarding this important point.
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which exists here and now, independently of what will actually be the case. With these two ideas in mind
we are now ready to continue.
Faculties are a machinery which can allow us to compress the quantum experience into a picture of
the world, just like entities such as particles, waves and fields, allow us to do so in classical physics. The
mode of being of a faculty is potentiality, not thought in terms of possibility (which relies on actuality)
but rather in terms of ontological potentiality, as a mode of existence. I have the faculty of raising my
hand, which does not mean that ‘I will raise my hand’ or that ‘I will not raise my hand’; what it means
is that here and now I possess a faculty which exists in the mode of being of potentiality, independent of
what will happen in actuality. Faculties do not exist in the mode of being of actuality, faculties are not
actual existents, we cannot “see” faculties, we can only experience with them. It is important to notice
there is no difference in this point with the case of entities, as we have discussed earlier: we cannot “see”
entities either. Entities, in classical mechanics, as well as faculties, in quantum mechanics, are the basic
presuppositions needed for the determination of the classical and quantum experience, they act as the
machinery which is able to bring together observation and measurement.
Faculties should not be regarded as equivalent to a process, there is no need of a lapse of time for
a faculty to exist. Faculties exist instantaneously, in the mode of being of ontological potentiality. The
process is that through which we access the faculties, in the same way we access entities through an
examination of their properties. Entities exist per se, as essences, independently of the rest of the world,
they are non-contextual existents. Faculties, on the other hand, are explicitly determined in relation to
what we can do in a definite state of affairs; i.e. they are relational contextual existents. The notion
of complementarity plays a central role here, understood in this case, not as bringing together different
incompatible representations, but rather, as providing the constrains under which faculties exist.
A faculty maintains a logic of actions and relations which do not necessarily take place in actuality, a
faculty is and is not, here and now. Heisenberg’s principle must be understood in this case as providing
the mathematical expression of this basic character of faculties which refers to its being indetermined.
The difference with entities in classical physics regards the way in which this experience is produced, the
conditions which allow us to experience with faculties are certainly different.
Faculties are indetermined and contextual existents. A faculty is structured always by a certain ‘power
to do’, a power which relates to the configuration of relations in a given state of affairs. I possess the
faculties of running and swimming, but in order for these faculties to exists, I must be either in a place
where I can run, or in a place where I can swim. I can say: “I can swim (here and now)” only if, given
the state of affairs, I am able to do so. In order to swim I obviously need to be in a place where I can
swim, like for example in a swimmingpool. This has nothing to do with the fact that in the near future
I choose either to swim or not to swim while I’m in the swimmingpool. In a swimmingpool however, I
am not able to run, just in the same way that I am not able to swim in the street. In our earlier terms
the context determines the existence of the faculty explicitly.
5.2 Understanding the Notion of ‘Superposition’ in terms of a Faculty
A basic question which we have posed to ourselves at the beginning of our trip regards the meaning of
a superposition. What does it mean to have a superposition |ψB〉 = α|up〉 + β|down〉? How can we
most clearly expose it conceptually and relate it to physical reality? Our theory of faculties has been
developed in order to answer this particular question and is an appendix of our earlier distinction between
perspective and context.
The entanglement between the idea of entity and the structure of the quantum formalism was discussed
above, placing the choice of the basis as an active constituent of that which is discussed in a definite
context, namely, a superposition. It is important to notice that in relation to the active status of the
basis in the superposition, given the ‘x basis’ we obtain a faculty, call it Fx, |αx〉+ |βx〉, while a rotation
to the ‘y basis’ gives place to a different faculty Fy, |αy〉 + |βy〉. These two mathematical expressions
Fx = 1√2 [|αx〉+ |βx〉] and Fy = 1√2 [|αy〉+ |βy〉] give place to different incompatible existents. In this sense,
incompatibility is a central feature of faculties.
We understand a superposition as encoding the state of the faculty and its power. The notion of state
of a faculty goes against the basic principles of Aristotelian logic. Firstly, it does not exist in actuality,
we cannot see a faculty in the same way we see an object. We understand the state of a faculty as
existing in the realm of ontological potentiality. Secondly, the elements of that which constitutes the
state of a faculty violates the principle of non-contradiction. The logical structure of a faculty —given
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mathematically by the superposition— is such that a property and its negative exist at one and the same
time, just in the same way, when I have the faculty of raising my hand both actions (‘raising my hand’
and ‘not raising my hand’) co-exist in the definition itself of having a faculty. The faculty is sustained
activity, something which is and is not. Finally, if thought in terms of faculties the notion of identity
simply losses its meaning. A faculty is not a substantive of which one can predicate certain properties.
A faculty is a sustained verb, sustained activity, and it makes no sense to talk of verbs as having identity
or individuality. Would it make sense to ask if the faculty of swimming can be one and the same through
time? This is simply a badly posed question. One can make this question with respect to entities because
entities exist as essences, and in this sense there is something which remains the same and equal to itself.
In the case of faculties we do not deal with essences, but with pure relations.
5.3 Faculties Instead of Entities
Our strong thesis is that we have been stating the wrong questions to quantum mechanics, we have been
always asking about ‘entities’ while quantum mechanics can only answer questions which have to do with
‘faculties’. An entity, as thought in physical terms, is governed by the principles of classical (Aristotelian)
logic: principle of existence, principle of identity and principle of non-contradiction. A faculty can be
thought in terms of the principles which give place to quantum theory, namely: Heisenberg’s principle
of indetermination, Bohr’s principle of complementarity and the superposition principle. In the ontology
we are discussing there is only active relations, a logic of action in contraposition to the statical logic of
Aristotle. How to think in terms of this logic is not obvious and might be regarded as the most difficult
task of our time. We have to learn to think in terms of change and process. Our strong claim is that, just
like entities exist in the realm of classical physics, faculties exist in realm of quantum physics. Instead of
a logic of essences which refers to entities, we have a logic of actions which refers to faculties.32
In terms of our distinctions between perspectives and contexts, a superposition, |ψB〉, can be thought
as being “the state of a faculty”. The perspective, Ψ, can be thought as pure potentia, in the sense of
pure relational activity, as describing pure, non-actualized relations between faculties. It should be noted
that the term potentia to which we refer should be understood not in terms of Aristotle but rather in
relation to Spinoza, as a power to do, power to affect. In this framework there are no entities whatsoever,
entities appear only in later stages, when we destroy through our choices, the basic characters of the
quantum description and we impose the classical structure. After this fateful operation is produced inde-
termination is translated into uncertainty, the ontological incompatibility of properties into a discursive
complementarity of classical representations, and finally, superpositions are simply forgotten and read as
a mathematical weirdness which gives place to algorithmic results.
In order to put everything which have been exposed until now we present the following diagram:
PERSPECTIVE HOLISTIC REDUCTIONISTIC MEASUREMENT
CONTEXT CONTEXT RESULT
MODE OF BEING potential potential possible/probable actual
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION Ψ |ψB〉 |ψB〉 αk, |αk〉
CONCEPTUAL EXPRESSION active relations superposition ensemble single term
PROPERTY – holisic/non-Boolean reductionistic/Boolean actual
DESCRIPTION IN TERMS OF potentia faculty possible entities actual entity
indetermination indetermination existence existence
LOGICAL PRINCIPLES complementarity complementarity non-contradiction non-contradiction
superposition superposition identity identity
5.4 ...What can be Observed?
The problem of measurement in quantum theory has been a great matter of debate. As noted already,
measurements become a completely subjective structure when related to entities, in quantum mechanics
entities exist only because we measure.33 Our investigation has been guided by the words of Einstein
32In this line of thought we call the attention to the work of Bob Coecke and Sonja Smets regarding the dynamical
development of operational quantum logic, see [11] and [61].
33This can be justified in many ways, maybe the most clear for us remains the constrains imposed by KS theorem,
which makes clear the fact that one has to choose different sets of mutually incompatible properties, this choice determines
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who’s echoes have reached our days: “It is only the theory which can tell you what can be observed”.
As we noted already, our intention is to recover an objective account of the states of affairs discussed by
quantum theory. In this sense, one of the most important tasks which we have assumed is the analysis
of the meaning of measurement in quantum mechanics. In particular, we must be able to give a proper
account of the measurement process in relation to faculties, i.e. we must provide the conditions under
which it is meaningful to talk about a “measurement of a faculty”.
In classical mechanics we observe entities which exist as elements of an essentially static structure34
and observation appears as bringing into stage that which exists in actuality. In quantum mechanics things
take place in a very different way, we observe faculties which make themselves present through action
and change. In quantum theory we only measure shifts of energy, change, processes. This fundamental
point was already noticed by Nancy Cartwright:
“It makes good sense to take energy transitions as basic for the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. For it is only through interchanging energy that quantum systems interact and can register their
interactions in a macroscopically observable way. In a very well-known argument against reduction
of the wave packet, Hans Margenau has urged that all measurements are ultimately measurements
of position. But this should be pushed one step further. All position measurements are ultimately
measurements of energy transitions. No matter that a particle passes by a detector —the detector
will not register unless it exchanges some energy with the particle. The exchange of energy is the
basic event that happens in quantum mechanics; and the basic event whose effects are theoretically
described and predicated.” N. Cartwright ([10], p.55)
The concept of faculty confronts a problem which does not find an answer in terms of entities. How
can we think of something which is different every time it is realized in an experimental procedure but
rests simultaneously one? Let’s imagine that we are in the shore of a river, its full of stones. We grab a
stone and through it into the river, we grab another stone and through it, and then another one. Each
one of the stones is different, we through them from different places at different times and even the lake
changes as we add stones to it which were not there before. The question we should ask is what can
be generalized in this process? Every action involves a singularity because there are different stones
involved, the sun crosses the sky, I get older as time passes by. The abstraction we can do in order to
generalize that which we have described deals with the process itself, that to which we can refer as being
the same is ‘the action of throwing rocks’. In order to find regularities we need to shift from the subject
to the verb. That which is the same but has no reference to something is a faculty. A faculty is observed
through a process. The stones are not the same, neither the lake, that which remains “the same” is the
action itself. A repetition of a difference.
The orthodox interpretation presents the superposition as referring to the electron itself, to the prob-
ability of finding a particular property of this entity. Thus, within this interpretation, the superposition
encodes the properties of a system. Our interpretation in terms of faculties presents the superposition
as referring to a certain faculty, which I have in relation to the experimental arrangement, a ‘power to
do’ which is encoded in a mathematical expression. The faculty is observed through a process, a shift in
energy. Observation takes place through the shift of energy within a given state of affairs. Objectivity
is regained in quantum measurements when we forget about entities and discuss in terms of faculties.
Just like entities exist even when there is no light to see them, faculties exist in the world regardless
of observation and measurement outcomes. Just in the same way that entities appear to us through
contemplation, and remain in the dark when light does not shine upon them, faculties can be observed
through the shifts of energy and remain unknown when change is forgotten. In quantum mechanics only
change, shifts of energy, are taken into account, the quantum postulate does not only imply a different
way of acquiring sense data, it is the basic cornerstone of a definition of a new experience.
It is important to remark however that these examples are only limited in their use, more specifically
it should be noticed that the capability of observing actions within the classical scheme is continuous, and
not discrete as in the case of quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we observe continuous process.
explicitly the entity under study.
34In classical physics the static structure regards the logical scheme already put forward by Aristotle. As noted by
Verelst and Coecke: “[...] change and motion are intrinsically not provided for in [the Aristotelian] framework; therefore
the ontology underlying the logical system of knowledge is essentially static, and requires the introduction of a First Mover
with a proper ontological status beyond the phenomena for whose change and motion he must account.” Quoted from [63],
p. 172.
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The notion of continuity is here of major importance and has not been investigated adequately.
Classical Mechanics Quantum Mechanics
OBSERVATION Continuous path. Discrete shift.
MEASUREMENT Properties Process (energy shift)
Objective account of physical Entities Faculties
reality in terms of ...
6 Interpreting Quantum Paradoxes
Our theory of faculties will be interesting, only in the case it is able to provide the formalism of quantum
mechanics with a picture (an anshaulich content) which describes the experience provided by quantum
theory in an elegant way. A way which provides a deeper understanding of what is going on according to
quantum theory. Off course, our idea is not to provide understanding in classical terms, like for example
Bohm’s causal interpretation or many worlds intend to do. There are many hidden presumptions and
intentions which can make us differ in our choice for a definite interpretation. Justification of the choice
we make might differ, and even though empirical success remains basic, also beauty, simplicity and the
conceptual richness to provide new questions (rather than answers) are always implicitly or explicitly
taken into account by physicists. We hope that our conceptual scheme is able to shed new light regarding
the question: what is quantum mechanics talking about? In this paper we will focus in interpreting,
through our theory of faculties, two of the most discussed experiments of quantum mechanics, namely,
the double slit experiment and Scho¨dinger’s cat.
6.1 The Double-Slit Experiment: Complementary Representations
The double-slit (DS) experiment was one of the first to expose the paradoxical character of the quantum
formalism with respect to classical physics. Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein discussed in many occasions
the possible interpretation of this thought experiment, which shows that the ‘same’ quantum wave func-
tion provides information of incompatible classical representations, such as those of ‘particles’ and ‘waves’
([66], p.9). There is a weird entanglement between the entities involved (particles and waves) and the
mathematical formulation which represents them. The most important assumption involved in the DS
experiment is that the quantum wave function makes reference to some kind of entity. It is this hypothe-
sis, which remains untouched at the basis of our classical reasoning about physical reality, which has not
been adequately discussed. There are further presuppositions involved however in this experiment which
we would like to analyze, this we’d like to do in terms of an ad absurdum proof, whose hypothesis are the
following:35
H1 (entity existence): There is some kind of entity which we are studying through the DS experi-
ment.
H2 (quantum representation): The quantum wave function Ψ respects the rules provided by quan-
tum mechanics and represents a feature of physical reality as exposed by the experiment.
H3 (empirical consistency): Observation discovers some unknown but preexistent property of the
entity under study.
H4 (objective consistency): The entity as represented by our physical theory exists independently
of observation.
The DS experiment shows most clearly that if one assumes all these hypotheses simultaneously one
can logically deliver a contradiction, namely, that the electron, as represented by the quantum wave
function Ψ, ‘is a particle’ (|ψpart〉) and ‘is a wave’ (|ψwave〉). In our terms, the idea behind the curtains
35This is in analogous way to Diederik Aerts’ reading of EPR [2].
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is that the perspective Ψ is something of which the reductionistic contexts, |ψpart〉 and |ψwave〉, are mere
representations, detached observations. The quantum wave function represents the ‘electron’ which is
presupposed to exists in physical reality, but its existence is contradictory. Depending of the experimental
set-up the electron behaves as if it was a particle, or as if it was a wave. Thus, it is not possible to
presuppose the existence of the quantum wave function Ψ as an entity with definite (non-contradictory)
properties. There is no analogue in classical thought of this experience.36 The experiment makes clear
that there is at least one of these hypothesis which must be left aside.
Most discussions have been centered in leaving aside hypothesis H2, H3 and H4. For example,
Bohmian mechanics tries to change H2 and proposes instead a new theory, with rules closer to classical
ideas. Also GRW changes the Schro¨dinger equation of motion to a non-linear one in order to explain
clearly the relation between the mathematical scheme and experience without quantum jumps. For
reasons which might be already clear form earlier sections, we are mostly interested in Bohr’s proposal
which attacked mainly H3 and H4. Bohr’s idea is to take quantum mechanics as a regulative theory
of classical representations and that, by changing the notion of objectivity —now considered in terms
of intersubjective agreemnet— one might retain the classical description needed to describe (classical)
phenomena. As discussed above, Niels Bohr created the concept of complementarity in order to bring
together incompatible (classical) representations. Complementarity, according to Bohr, is a regulative
principle which allows to secure objectivity and our classical discourse about phenomena. Heisenberg’s
principle is interpreted in this context as uncertainty relations, as providing the constraints of knowledge of
the properties under study. This gnoseological interpretation presents quantum mechanics as providing
a secure ground to talk about Nature, according to classical physics, avoiding at the same time the
unconfortable discussion regarding the relation between physical reality and quantum mechanics.
H1 remains such a deep presumption of classical physical ideas that most of the discussions that one
encounters do not even mention H1 as hypothesis. The basic assumption that the quantum wave function
describes some kind of entity remains untouched in every discussion. But, is it necessary to make such
presuppositions in quantum physics when we know that quantum mechanics was born from the very
departure of the classical description of Nature in terms of entities? As discussed above our main idea is
to leave aside H1 and show that one can still make sense of the double slit experiment. We have to stop
thinking in terms of ‘entities’ which exist in the world, in its place we propose to discuss this experiment
of quantum mechanics in terms of ‘faculties’. Let’s see how this works out.
It is important to remark that in the DS experiment the state of affairs is changed drastically by
adding an apparatus; i.e. the plate which covers one of the slits. The state of affairs which refers to
the two slits open determines the faculty of ‘producing an interference pattern’. Just in same way that
if I am in a swimmingpool I have the faculty of swimming and I can then say: “I can swim (here and
now)”, when the two slits are open, the experimenter can say: “The shift in energy of this state of affairs
produces an ‘interference pattern’ in the photographic plate (here and now)”, as a secondary inference,
in this case we are allowed to talk about waves. On the other hand, if we close one of the slits the
experimenter can refer to “The shift in energy of this state of affairs produces a ‘Gaussian pattern’ in the
photographic plate (here and now)”, and in this case we are allowed to speak about particles. The new
state of affairs, the new context, determines a new faculty (which was hidden in the perspective). In this
case the experimenter can say: “I can produce a Gaussian pattern in the photographic plate (here and
now)” just like I can say: “I can run” if I go out of the swimmingpool and jump into the street.
Quantum physics does not presuppose the existence of particles nor waves, these are just derivative
concepts which are produced by the given state of affairs and several interpretational cuts which have
been discussed in [51]. Quantum mechanics does not talk about particles nor waves (swimmers nor
runners), it talks about faculties. Off course when I am in a certain state of affairs I can only perform
those experiments which are then brought into existence. A particular state of affairs may always turn
incompatible a different state of affairs. In the same way, running and swimming are incompatible faculties,
each faculty presupposes a state of affairs which precludes the possibility of existence of the other. If I
have the faculty of swimming, I must be obviously in some place with water, but in such place I cannot
run. Contrary to this if I am able to run, I should be for example in the street, but then, obviously I will
not be able to swim.
36It is important to notice that in classical experience there are also incompatible experimental arrangements. Diederik
Aerts proposed to discuss in relation to this, a piece of wood which has the property of being ‘burnable’ and the property
of ‘floating’ [1]. The experiments which express the property are mutually incompatible, however the important point is
that in the classical scheme one can think of both properties as existents of the entity under study without getting into
contradictions. Experiment appears here only as discovering the properties of the entity not as constituting them.
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We believe that the language which we are putting forward is more appropriate to discuss quantum
experiments, it can even open the doors of new experiments which have been hidden by the classical
(entity dependent) description. The weirdness of the double slit experiment appears when one wants
to stop talking about faculties and starts talking about entities, instead of talking about the faculty of
running or the faculty of swimming one wishes to return to the classical realm and talk about swimmers
and runners, particles and waves.
6.2 Schro¨dinger’s Cat: Superposition of Properties
Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment is one of the best examples of what happens when one mixes the quantum
formalism with the classical language [59]. The paradox appears when we force the results of the quantum
formalism into the classical language. The cat cannot be dead or alive simply because a cat is an
entity, and as such, it presupposes the classical description. In the classical description every property is
determined and cannot relate to others in the way the quantum formalism indicates.
Now, how do we interpret this experiment through our theory of faculties? Here, we must forget
about cats and electrons possessing properties in the actual mode of existence, this is the trap into which
the classical language forces us inn. What we have is the faculty, call it FSx , of ‘having spin in the
x-direction’ given that we have our Stern-Gerlach apparatus aligned in the x-direction. We can only refer
to the faculties which arise from this given state of affairs.
In quantum mechanics we get into weird contradictions when we choose to talk about entities. In
quantum mechanics there is no preexistent property such as spin, simply because there is no entity which
has this property. In quantum mechanics a property is an answer to a question which relates to a shift
of energy in a given state of affairs. One gets into contradictions if one states that an electron, without
proper reference to the experimental arrangement (state of affairs), has the property of having spin in
the x-direction.
The incompatibility is however of a different degree to that of the double slit experiment. In this case
the incompatibility is not between classical representations which correspond to the level of reductionistic
contexts but rather between superpositions or improper mixtures which pertain to the holistic context.
The distance lyes in the fact that a superposition, contrary to a particle or a wave, cannot be subsumed
into the presuppositions of the classical description. This is an incompatibility not between classical
representations but between purely quantum representations.
6.3 Classical and Quantum Experience
In our terms, the incompatibility present in the DS experiment is between what we have called ‘reduc-
tionistic contexts’. Even though these reductionistic contexts can not be thought as providing different
views or representation of one and the same entity, each of them, by themselves can be though as exiting
in terms of entities, i.e. in terms of particles or in terms of waves (proper mixtures). There is an intrinsic
difference between the DS experiment and Schrodinger’s cat experiments. This latter experiment goes a
step further and discusses the incompatibility of holistic contexts, of superpositions, which can never be
thought in terms of entities, even when taken into account separately. It is this difference which draws
the subtle line between quantum and classical experience.
Richard Feynman [27] referred to the double slit experiment in the following terms: “We choose to
examine a phenomenon [the double slit experiment] which is impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain
in a classical way, and which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it contains the only
mystery.” We do not agree with this statement, as we saw above this is only the tip of the iceberg, there
are much deeper problems into which quantum mechanics confronts us.
As a final resume of the analysis we have been proposing:
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DOUBLE-SLIT EXPERIMENT SCHRO¨DINGER’S CAT EXPERIMENT
ANALYSIS Gnoseological Ontological
Complementary relations: between classical Principle of Complementarity: relates q-properties.
PRINCIPLES representations (wave/particle). Principle of Indetermination: mode of
AND Uncertainty relations: secures the limits of existence of q-properties.
RELATIONS complementary relations. Principle of Superposition: composition
The superposition is thought it terms of a wave. of q-properties.
SCHEMES Perspective Ψ relative to the Single holistic context
reductionistic contexts ψpart and ψwave. ψB = |up〉+ |down〉.
CLASSICAL Talk as if it was particle or wave; Cannot talk in terms of entities.
DESCRIPTION i.e. in terms of entities.
QUANTUM Changing the state of affairs by adding The same state of affairs
DESCRIPTION an apparatus produces different faculties. does not change the faculties.
7 Conclusions
Quantum mechanics and classical mechanics do not talk about different worlds, but rather, provide
complementary descriptions of one and the same world, they express reality through different descriptions
which have in their heart incommensurable relations. Classical mechanics might be regarded as that which
refers to actuality through the principles of classical Aristotelian logic, quantum mechanics, on the other
hand, can be seen as providing a description of the potential as a mode of the being, through the principles
of indetermination, superposition and complementarity [50, 51, 52].
According to our view, quantum mechanics talks about faculties and their relations to the world. Ψ
is an expression of the condition of possibility to perform a certain experiment. The faculty describes a
level which does not pertain to things but rather to potential actions. A faculty is expressed in terms of
an objective state of affairs through the shifts in energy observed in measurement interactions. Faculties
exist ; i.e. they are in the world just like “things” are. Classical physics is the study of the world as
constituted by entities which exist in the mode of being of actuality. Quantum physics is the study of
the world as constituted by faculties which exist in the mode of being of potentiality. This should be
understood as a step forward in the level of abstraction regarding our understanding of reality.
The price to pay, if we are willing to recover the objective character of quantum mechanics is to leave
aside the concept of entity and with it, the whole classical description of the world. The most important
test regarding this approach remains, as with any physical theory, the possibility to determine a new
experience. It will be important not only to understand well known experiments, but also to find out
about new ones, experiments which have not been thought until now, and which our theory of faculties
can help to develop.
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